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GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF BANKS: A CURSE
OR A BLESSING FOR THE UNITED STATES?
YUEH-PING (ALEX) YANG*
ABSTRACT
During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, the Treasury injected an enormous amount of capital and held equity in 707
financial institutions to stabilize the U.S. financial system. The
government’s large-scale ownership of banks alarmed the U.S. banking sector. The mainstream opinion in the United States strongly
opposed this practice, mostly due to the distrust of the government
and the fear that government intervention would jeopardize private
shareholders’ interests. Later developments, including the Treasury’s quick exit from its holdings and the Dodd-Frank Act’s declaration of the end of bailouts, suggest that the U.S. government
eventually succumbed to the mainstream opinion.
Such sentiment against government ownership appears to
be no more than a myth. In this Article, I provide a balanced view
of government ownership in the U.S. context. By tracing the experience of government ownership of private corporations throughout U.S. history, I find that the United States not only is familiar
with this practice, but also has developed a set of governance rules
to constrain the government’s potential abuse of its power derived
from the ownership. Empirical evidence based on cross-country data
also suggests that a competitive financial market, a developed
financial system, and advanced political institutions may control
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the downsides of government ownership of banks; the United States
possesses all of these institutions. In fact, in this post–Financial
Crisis era, where risk management has become a pillar of good
bank governance, government ownership of banks can bring benefits to the U.S. banking sector. Specifically, government directors
appointed by the government owner can better represent creditors’
interests, supplement incomplete banking regulation and supervision, and reduce informational asymmetry between the banking
regulator and banks. This, in turn, can improve poor risk management of banks and lead to greater financial stability. What the
United States needs is not a complete rejection of government ownership, but proper legal designs to control the government’s exercise
of its ownership, such as a conditional and temporary adoption
of government ownership, a minority-based governance structure,
clear roles and duties of government directors, statutory access to
fiduciary claims against government directors, and disclosure rules.
The balanced views provided in this Article can allow the United
States to be more comfortable with the prospective use of government ownership in the banking sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike governments in most jurisdictions, the U.S. government generally resists owning firms.1 The financial crisis of 2007–
2008 (Financial Crisis), however, challenged such resistance. 2 To
stabilize the financial system, the U.S. government injected an
enormous amount of capital into financial institutions, mostly
banks, to maintain liquidity and protect against insolvency.3 As
a result, the Treasury held equity in 707 U.S. financial institutions, including the American International Group, Inc. (AIG),
Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), and Bank of America (BoA), etc.4 In
some instances, the Treasury even appointed its representatives
to the board of the financial institutions.5 In effect, it became a
giant bank-holding entity: the “Treasury Inc.”6
Unsurprisingly, the Treasury Inc. incurred strong and
widespread opposition within the United States. The opposition
came from three major concerns.7 The first concern relates to the
1 Catherine C. Eckel & Theo Vermaelen, Internal Regulation: The Effects of
Government Ownership on the Value of the Firm, 29 J.L. & ECON. 381, 382 (1986);
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2917, 2925 (2012). As a definitional matter, throughout this Article,
the term “government ownership” refers to any level of a government’s equities in private firms, either in the form of common stock, preferred stock, or
equity warranty, be it majority or minority, voting or non-voting.
2 Throughout this Article, the term “Financial Crisis” refers to the global
financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007. It originated from increasing
subprime mortgage defaults and the reverse of decades-long increases in home
prices (the so-called “subprime crisis”). The subprime crisis, in turn, froze up
the credit market and then threatened the liquidity and solvency of the largest global financial institutions, which eventually harmed the whole financial
system. For a brief introduction to the Financial Crisis, as well as its impact,
see generally HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 41–52 (21st ed. 2016).
3 See id. at 82–83.
4 See infra Section I.C.
5 Id.
6 See generally J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (2010) [hereinafter
Verret, Treasury Inc.].
7 Other concerns include the fear that the market might perceive the banks
receiving government funds as backed by the government and thus, less likely to
fail, and that government ownership is inherently incompatible with the U.S.
corporate and securities laws. See J.W. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public
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taxpayers’ interest.8 Critics were concerned that, in rescuing the
too-big-to-fail financial institutions, the government might overpay the price for their equity and end up wasting the taxpayers’
money.9 The second concern relates to the incumbent shareholders’ interest. Critics were concerned that, in the bailout process,
the government would nationalize the banks and thus effectively
appropriate the equity interest of incumbent shareholders in these
banks.10 The third concern relates to the general shareholders’
interest. Critics were concerned that, after acquiring the financial institutions’ ownership, the government might use their control derived therefrom to inefficiently intervene into the corporate
interests11 or even pursue the politicians’ political agendas rather
than shareholders’ interests.12
Choice Lens: Government-Controlled Corporations as a Mechanism for Rent
Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521, 1521 (2010) [hereinafter Verret, The
Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens]. See generally Verrett, Treasury Inc.,
supra note 6, at 283.
8 See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 409, 409 (2012); Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal
Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733,
1756 (2011); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term
Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2011).
9 For instance, the Congressional Oversight Panel studied the Treasury’s
investment during the Financial Crisis and found that the Treasury generally
overpaid for all of the assets in the study. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY
OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY’S ACQUISITIONS (2009), http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT47178/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT47178.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5E9V-QG44].
10 See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, Takings, Legitimacy, and Emergency Action:
Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 304 (2016);
Andrew J. Morris, When a Bailout is a Taking: Can Takings Solve the Problem of
the Government as Controlling Shareholder?, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 897, 898 (2014).
11 For instance, it was reported that Citigroup repaid its TARP funds earlier than expected in order to extricate itself from the Treasury’s control and
influence, particularly with respect to the restriction on its executive compensation policy. Matthew R. Shahabian, The Government as Shareholder and Political Risk: Procedural Protections in the Bailout, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 351, 362 (2011).
12 See, e.g., Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder:” Government,
Business, and the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 583 (2010); Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When
the Government is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 409, 412 (2010) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware];
Shahabian, supra note 11, at 352; Benjamin A. Templin, The Government
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To alleviate these concerns, the Treasury tried its best to
assure Americans that it was reluctant to take ownership of banks.
It declared that it would hold equities only on a short-term basis.13 During this period, it also promised that it would act as
passively as possible to minimize intervention in the corporate
decisions of banks.14 In general, the Treasury kept its promise: it
exited from most of its equity holdings within two years after the
Financial Crisis.15 Moreover, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Congress further
declared the policy goal of “ending bailouts” in the United States.16
In this way, the U.S. government and Congress eventually succumbed to the opponents of government ownership. Accordingly,
even though the Financial Crisis on its face challenged the U.S.
government’s resistance to owning financial institutions, the developments during and after the Financial Crisis in fact affirmed,
and even intensified, such resistance.
It is worth noting that, amidst these critics, their ways of
addressing government ownership of banks diverge. While the
mainstream view proposes to simply reject this practice, an unneglectable number of studies take a moderate stance.17 Although
these studies also acknowledge that the government may abuse
its power, they propose to discipline it by imposing institutional
constraints on the exercise of government ownership. For instance,
to address the first concern identified above, i.e., the taxpayers’
interest, a number of studies have brought forward various proposals to ensure that the government bails out financial institutions
at a fair price.18 To address the second concern, i.e., the incumbent shareholders’ interest, the Court of Federal Claims in Starr
International Company v. United States19 has also attempted to
Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1127, 1164 (2010); Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 287.
13 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 331.
14 See id. at 295–96.
15 See infra Section I.C.
16 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
17 See Conti-Brown, supra note 8, at 427.
18 See, e.g., id. at 409; Manns, supra note 8, at 1369.
19 Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 434 (2015). For related
comments, see generally Mahoney, supra note 10, at 311.
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clarify the government’s rules of conduct to discipline the government’s use of bailout power.20
Interestingly, as to the third concern, i.e., the general
shareholders’ interest under government ownership, relatively
fewer studies propose practical institutional constraints to safeguard private shareholders. 21 The mainstream studies in this
aspect simply emphasize the draconian effect of government
ownership on private shareholders’ interest.22 They hypothesize
that the government is untrustworthy, and thus, any form of government ownership, a tool representing egregious market intervention from the government, is undesirable.23 This mainstream
view, however, requires some re-evaluation from at least the following three aspects. First, the ingrained distrust of government ownership might be a myth. The overall empirical evidence, as will
be demonstrated in this Article, suggests that with adequate institutional safeguards, government ownership of banks would not
jeopardize shareholders’ interests or social welfare.24 Second, government ownership of banks can also produce advantages. Specifically, corporate governance of banks after the Financial Crisis
calls for strong vehicles to prevent mismanagement of business
directors, while government ownership could serve as this vehicle.
Third, institutional designs, instead of wholesale rejection, might
be a better way to control the potential disadvantages of government ownership of banks. Proper institutional designs can safeguard taxpayers’ interests and incumbent shareholders’ interests
when the government bails out banks, and they should be able
to work in the case of general shareholders’ interests.
In reality, the U.S. government cannot rule out the possibility of future ownership of banks. The “too-big-to-fail” problem
In 2017, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the
decision of the Court of Federal Claims and declared part of the decision moot.
See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
21 For the minority opinion, see, e.g., Black, supra note 12, at 565.
22 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1297–98; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 351–52; Verret,
Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 287; Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice
Lens, supra note 7, at 1524.
23 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1308.
24 See infra Part II.
20
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inherent in the U.S. banking sector remains, rendering the DoddFrank Act’s efforts in restricting the government’s future bailout
of insolvent banks25 less credible. Therefore, government ownership of banks, though undesirable, might remain inevitable.26
The U.S. banking sector should at least learn how to handle this
practice. This post–Financial Crisis era, when we still have fresh
memories about the fragility of financial systems as well as government ownership of banks, offers an appropriate time to ascertain how to harmonize government ownership of banks with
the U.S. financial system.
In light of the above, I revisit the practice of government
ownership in the United States, with a focus on the banking sector. This Article is structured as follows: Part I begins by reviewing the evolution of government ownership in the United States
and demonstrates that such practice, to the United States, is in fact
not that unfamiliar. To lay down foundations for further discussion, this Part also reviews associated debates over this practice
and briefs the mainstream opinion against this practice in the
United States.
Part II addresses the perceived downsides of government
ownership of banks, particularly the fear of heightened agency costs
and political interference. I argue that, for a regulated sector like
25 The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act declares that one of the Act’s objectives is “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.” Dodd-Frank Act,
section 1101 further amends the Federal Reserve Act, section 13(3), thereby
restricting the Federal Reserve’s use of its emergency authority to programs
with “broad-based eligibility” and requiring the Federal Reserve to design rules
for ensuring that its emergency lending is “not to aid a failing financial company.” Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). This amendment aimed at foreclosing
the support of individual insolvent banks (such as Bear Stearns and AIG
during the Financial Crisis). SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 93–94. President
Obama also stated that, “because of this law, the American people will never
again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.” Remarks on Signing of
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, WHITE HOUSE
(July 21, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks
-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act
[http://perma.cc/MAE6-G2XW].
26 For literature suspecting that the Dodd-Frank Act can end future bailouts,
see generally Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout
Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 536 (2015); Conti-Brown, supra note
8, at 431; Manns, supra note 8, at 1382.
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the banking sector, the negative effects associated with the government could be marginal and should not be exaggerated. After
all, heavy regulation might have imposed a considerable amount
of cost. In addition, although government ownership of banks appears to harm individual firm performance and overall economic
development in a general sense, the United States may possess
institutional infrastructures that can mitigate these downsides,
including: (1) a competitive financial market; (2) a well-developed
financial system; and (3) transparent and accountable political
institutions. Accordingly, I advocate a U.S. exception to the perceived downsides of government ownership of banks.
Part III turns to the bright sides of government ownership.
I argue that through its ownership, the government may appoint
directors to the boards of the bailed-out banks, thereby improving poor risk management and contributing to financial stability. Current studies of bank governance widely acknowledge that
banks require robust risk management to protect creditors’ interests as well as their own stability and survival. The practice
entrusts this task mainly to the boards of directors of banks. The
Financial Crisis, however, exposed the failure of current board
practice in the United States. Business directors turned out to
have neither the capacity to manage risks nor adequate incentive
to resist pursuing short-term profits in order to mitigate long-term
risks. To address this dilemma of corporate governance, government owners, and their appointed government directors, could be
an answer. They may have better incentives. They may supplement incomplete financial supervision and thus serve as another
channel for the financial regulator to implement its regulatory
policies. They may further reduce the informational asymmetries
between banks and the regulator. Accordingly, I argue that the
benefits of government directorship of banks should not be obscured. At the very least, when an individual bank goes insolvent
and calls for the government’s bailout, that bank’s board failure
should be well inferred, which justifies the introduction of government directors.
Based on the above analyses, in Part IV, I advocate that U.S.
society should be more positive toward government ownership of
banks. I specifically discuss a model employing government ownership and government directors, under which the regulator has the
authority to appoint a small number of directors for a specified
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period of time when a bank fails to properly perform its risk management. I also discuss some practical considerations related to
government ownership of banks, including the source of talents
of government directors, the ownership and directorship structure,
the role and mission of government directors, access to fiduciary
claims against government owners and directors, and disclosures.
This Article concludes in the last section.
Throughout this Article, I will provide a different lens for
the United States to reflect on government ownership of banks.
The downsides of this practice are certainly real but should not
be exaggerated, while the bright sides should not be ignored.
With proper legal design, government ownership of banks could
be a blessing instead of a curse in the United States. I anticipate
that the analysis of this Article provides some balanced views
and allows U.S. society to be more comfortable with the prospective use of government ownership.
I. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
RESISTANCE TO IT
Opponents of government ownership believe a myth that
this governmental act is extraordinary. Indeed, compared with most
jurisdictions around the world, this practice is relatively uncommon in the United States.27 It is, however, by no means absent.
The U.S. government adopted this practice from time to time. In
this Part, I will review the evolution of government ownership
practice in the United States first, and then explore the grounds
adopted by the mainstream opinion in the United States for opposing such practice.
A. The Evolution of Government Ownership in the United States
Before the Financial Crisis
There are two major types of government ownership in the
United States: government corporations and government ownership of private corporations.28
27
28

Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2925.
See id. at 2926.
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1. The Evolution of Government Corporations
“Government corporations” refers to corporations chartered
by Congress or states to achieve governmental objectives.29 They
behave like governmental agencies dressed in corporate form. 30
While I do not intend to address the practices and challenges associated with government corporations in this Article, a brief review
of their evolution is helpful for understanding the whole picture
of government ownership in the United States.
Before World War II, government corporations were common
in the United States.31 The first government corporation was the
Bank of the United States: in 1791, Congress authorized the U.S.
government to subscribe 20 percent of its stock.32 After its expiration, Congress chartered another government corporation, i.e.,
the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, and again authorized the U.S. government to subscribe 20 percent of its stock.33
Congress also authorized the President to appoint five of the
twenty-five directors of the Second Bank of the United States, with
the Senate’s advice, while leaving the rest of the directors elected
annually by shareholders other than the U.S. government.34 Other
examples of government corporations in early ages included the
Union Pacific Railroad 35 and the Panama Railroad Company. 36
During World War I, the United States further commenced a “largescale use of government-controlled corporations” by incorporating
See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 291.
See Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2931.
31 For some summaries of government corporation practice in the U.S., see
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386–89 (1995). See also
Lloyd D. Musolf, American Mixed Enterprise and Government Responsibility,
24 W. POL. Q. 789, 795–801 (1971); Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2925–32; Verret,
Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 289.
32 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386 (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191, 196).
33 See id. at 386–87.
34 See id. (citing Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 266 and 269).
35 Congress chartered the Union Pacific Railroad in 1862 and authorized
the President to appoint two of its fifteen directors. Id. at 387 (citing Act of
July 1, 1862, § 1, 12 Stat. 489, 491).
36 The Panama Railroad Company was incorporated in 1849 in the State of
New York. The U.S. government purchased its stock from the New Panama
Canal Company of France in 1902 and became the sole shareholder. The Secretary
of War, as the holder of the stock, elected all of its thirteen directors. Id.
29
30
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the United States Grain Corporation, the United States Emergency
Fleet Corporation, the United States Spruce Production Corporation, and the War Finance Corporation.37 Nevertheless, it dissolved
most of them after the War ended.38
Government corporations subsequently re-emerged during the Great Depression.39 To stabilize the economy and make
distress loans to farms, homeowners, banks, and other enterprises,
the U.S. government again employed government corporations.40
The major instance was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC); Congress chartered it to make loans to banks, insurance
companies, railroads, land banks, and agricultural credit organizations41 and empowered it to incorporate corporations.42 Other
instances included the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Defense Homes
Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Associated Cooperatives,
Incorporated.43 At the end of World War II, there were in total
fifty-eight government corporations.44
After World War II, government corporations gradually lost
their popularity.45 Skeptics were increasingly concerned that the
U.S. government might circumvent its accountability through incorporating government corporations.46 These concerns ultimately
led to the abrogation of this practice.47 Many government corporations were dissolved.48 Although thereafter Congress still created
Id. at 388.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 The RFC, in turn, incorporated, among others, the Defense Plant Corporation, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Metals Reserve Company, the
Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the Rubber Development Corporation, and
the War Damage Corporation. Id. at 389.
43 Id. at 388–89.
44 Id. at 389.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 389–90. Congress passed the Government Corporation Control Act
(GCCA) in 1945, ordering the dissolution or liquidation of all government corporations except for those Congress should act to reincorporate and prohibiting the
creation of new government corporations without specific congressional authorization. Id.
48 Id. at 389.
37
38
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government corporations, their charters usually made it clear that
they were agencies of the U.S. government.49
Only a few ambiguities have occurred since the 1960s. One
was the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat).50 It was
a publicly traded corporation chartered by the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962.51 Though private shareholders own all the
shares of Comsat, the Comsat 1962 federal charter allowed the
U.S. President to appoint three “public interest” directors out of
its fifteen board members.52 This governance structure was designed to ensure governmental influence and supervision without
implicating the government’s financial interest in Comsat.53 It also
permitted a private company to raise private capital while enjoying preferential treatment from the government.54 The U.S. government subsequently followed this “Comsat model” and created
several “private” corporations.55
Two well-known government corporations that suffered severe criticism during the Financial Crisis are the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).56 Congress chartered these two
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) to establish secondary
market facilities for residential mortgages.57 Before the Financial
Crisis, the government held no equity interest in these two publicly
traded companies, but, according to their charters, the President
For instance, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 created the Overseas Private Investment Corporation while making it clear that it is “an agency of the
United States under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State.” Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, § 105, 83 Stat. 809 (1969) (codified
as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1969)).
50 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390.
51 Id. at 390, 397.
52 Id. at 390–91.
53 Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2927.
54 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390.
55 Instances include the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Legal Services Corporation, and Amtrak. See id. at 391.
56 Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart at News Conference Announcing Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2008),
https://www.fhfa.gov/media/publicaffairs/pages/statement-of-fhfa-director
-james-b--lockhart-at-news-conference-announcing-conservatorship-of-fannie
-mae-and-freddie-mac.aspx [https://perma.cc/S5DT-SRXW] [hereinafter Lockhart
Announcement].
57 Id.
49
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had the authority to appoint directors to their boards.58 After the
Financial Crisis broke out, the Federal Housing Finance Agency,
the competent authority in charge of these two GSEs, decided to
place these two companies in its conservatorship in September
2008.59 The Treasury, through the Making Home Affordable Program, injected $50 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
funding, together with the Federal Reserve’s $200 billion, to support these two entities.60 Eventually, the Treasury held new senior
preferred stock and common stock warrants amounting to 79.9
percent of each entity.61
Government corporations are incorporated by Congress
through special charter laws to pursue certain governmental objectives.62 While they are in corporate form, and some of them are
even publicly traded companies, their operation often implicates
other social or policy goals that are beyond commercial purposes;
this complicates the corporate governance of government corporations.63 In this Article, I do not intend to address the corporate
governance issues associated with these special corporations.
Rather, I will focus on those ordinary private banks of which the
government holds ownership.64
B. Government Ownership of Private Corporations Before the
Financial Crisis
Beyond chartering corporations to achieve governmental
objectives, the U.S. government occasionally holds ownership of
ordinary private corporations as a consequence of a political or
economic crisis.
Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 292.
Lockhart Announcement, supra note 56.
60 Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 296.
61 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra
note 12, at 1300, 1309. For further discussion of the details of the Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac bailouts, see Casey & Posner, supra note 26, at 507–12.
62 Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored
Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 570–71 (2005).
63 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1318.
64 For discussions of government corporations, see, e.g., Carnell, supra note
62, at 567, 569–72; Jill Spencer et al., The Cooperative Structure of the Federal
Loan Banks: A Model for Government Sponsored Enterprises, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 227, 228, 245 (2009).
58
59
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1. RFC Investments
The first notable instance was the RFC investments.65 As
mentioned above, Congress established the RFC in 1932 as a government corporation to make loans to banks, railroads, and local
governments. In March 1933, Congress passed the Emergency
Banking Act, authorizing the RFC to purchase preferred stock of
banks that ran short of capital.66 The RFC thus invested around
$1.2 billion in U.S. banks from 1933 to 1935.67 After 1935, banks
started to repay the government to purchase back their preferred
stock; when the RFC was abolished in 1957, less than $5 million
in two banks was unpaid.68
The RFC’s approach for managing the banks is arguable.69
The preferred stock that the RFC held carried voting rights.70 Based
on these voting rights, the RFC often appointed new executive
officers and directors after making an investment.71 In exchange
for the RFC’s assistance, senior executives of the receiving banks
even had to reduce their salaries.72 That said, the RFC Chairman
repeatedly emphasized that the RFC did not intend to dictate
management or coerce bank policies or bank investment.73
2. APC Companies
Another notable instance of government ownership of private corporations was the Alien Property Custodian companies
65 For a brief account of the RFC investments and comparison of the RFC
to the TARP, see Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 409,
422–24, 426–28 (2009); see also Walker F. Todd, History of and Rationales for
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 28 FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND, ECON.
REV. 22, 22–23, 27, 32 (1992).
66 Emergency Banking Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 304, 48 Stat. 1, 6 (1933).
67 Broome, supra note 65, at 423.
68 Id. at 423–24.
69 According to one commentator, the RFC’s experience “might provide some
comfort that government voting rights did not unnecessarily complicate the management of the banks in which the government invested.” Id. at 428. According to another commentator, the RFC, over time, became corrupted by politics.
Todd, supra note 65, at 26–28.
70 Broome, supra note 65, at 422.
71 Id.
72 Todd, supra note 65, at 26.
73 Broome, supra note 65, at 427.
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(APC companies).74 At the time the United States entered into
World War II, it seized enemy-owned assets in the United States,
including the stakes of German and Japanese corporations in
seventeen U.S. companies, some public and some private.75 The
portion of shares held by the government differed, ranging from
35 to 100 percent.76 The actual holding period also differed, ranging from one to twenty-three years.77
In these APC companies, the government’s approach was
seemingly hands-off. After acquiring blocks of shares, the government largely altered the composition of board members and
placed its representatives on the board.78 After changing board
members, however, the government’s role became passive. Except for transactions not in the normal course of business, which
required the government’s specific authorization, the government
did not actively direct the operation of these APC companies;
rather, it granted general authorizations to the management.79 In
this way, the government essentially played a supervisory role in
these companies.
3. Continental Illinois Corporation
Another notable example was Continental Illinois Corporation (CIC) in the 1980s. CIC was a publicly traded holding
company of Continental Illinois National Bank in Chicago, then
the seventh largest bank in the United States.80 Due to the bailout
of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984, the government
held CIC’s ownership. 81 The FDIC purchased a $720 million
issue of permanent, non-voting and junior preferred stock and a
$280 million issue of permanent, adjustable-rate and cumulative
74 For an introduction to the APC companies, see generally Stacey R. Kole &
J. Harold Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United
States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1997).
75 Id. at 1.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 6–8.
79 Id. at 8–9.
80 Black, supra note 12, at 576.
81 Id.
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preferred stock of CIC.82 This effectively gave the FDIC 80 percent
ownership of CIC.83
In managing CIC, the government again seemed to be rather
hands-off. Except that the FDIC, pursuant to the terms of the
government assistance, had a veto power over the nomination of
any director, and its shares bore no voting rights during the holding period.84 Additionally, except in limited areas, such as the
appointment of board members or proposed mergers, the FDIC
did not interfere with CIC’s day-to-day operations.85
4. Summary
In sum, the U.S. government was not unfamiliar with the
practice of government ownership before the Financial Crisis. In
addition, in light of the governance practice adopted in the RFC
investments, APC companies, and CIC, the U.S. government appeared to have developed a set of guidelines for managing its
ownership, which featured a rather hands-off approach.
C. The “Treasury, Inc.” and the Resistance to It
1. The “Treasury, Inc.” During the Financial Crisis
Aside from the above cases, the U.S. government generally refrained from holding ownership in private firms and private
financial institutions.86 It, however, abandoned such self-constraint
during the Financial Crisis.
Id. at 577.
Id.
84 Id. at 577–78.
85 Id. at 578. Despite this, both the banking community and Continental
Illinois still feared that the public would perceive CIC as a “nationalized” bank,
which could incur some competitive disadvantages. See id.
86 A prime exception to government-owned financial institutions is the Bank
of North Dakota (“BND”). “The BND is a wholly state owned and operated
bank [formed in 1919]—the only one of its kind in the United States currently,”
and is organized to foster local economic development, small business growth,
and localism and relational banking via community banks and credit unions.
Marc Schneiberg, Organizational Diversity and Regulatory Strategy in Financial
Markets: Possibilities for Upgrading and Reform, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 158
(2013). For a comprehensive introduction to the BND practice, especially how
it performs its development mission, see id. at 157–65.
82
83

2019]

GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF BANKS

685

The bailout during the Financial Crisis, particularly the
TARP, brought about the U.S. government’s large-scale ownership of financial institutions. To provide additional liquidity to
the credit market and prevent failures of systemically important
financial institutions, the U.S. government launched a series of
bailout measures during the Financial Crisis.87 Among them, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA), which established the TARP in October 2008.88 Within the
TARP framework, the Treasury launched several equity injection
programs,89 including, among others, the Capital Purchase Program (CPP).90 This led to the Treasury’s investment of around $205
billion into 707 financial institutions,91 including BoA, Citigroup, JP
Morgan, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.92 In
addition to the CPP, the AIG Investment Program (previously
known as Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program)
provided further investment in AIG,93 and the Targeted Investment Program (TIP) provided further investment in Citigroup and
For a summary of the U.S. government’s bailout measures during the
Financial Crisis, see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 52–93.
88 For an introduction to the U.S. government’s investment under TARP, see,
e.g., SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 78–82; Black, supra note 12, at 561–63.
89 Kahan & Rock indicated that the TARP originally aimed at stabilizing
the financial system by authorizing the Treasury to engage in the purchase of
troubled assets from troubled financial institutions, but the Treasury took advantage of the broad definition of “troubled assets” to obtain the entitlement
to purchase shares of troubled financial institutions. Kahan & Rock, When the
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1309–10. Shahabian
also reviewed legislative history and suggested that Congress, when passing the
TARP, intended equity purchase to be only a secondary tool to toxic assets purchase. Shahabian, supra note 11, at 357–58.
90 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra
note 12, at 1309.
91 Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment
-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/K9SC-8PSD].
92 For information related to the Treasury’s investment and subsequent disposition under the CPP, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MONTHLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS: December 2018 (2018), https://www.treasury.gov/initia
tives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/2018.12%20December%20Monthly
%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
93 Investment in American International Group, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig
/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7LK5-D6X9].
87
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BoA.94 In addition to bailing out financial institutions, the Treasury later extended its equity investment to automobile industries through the newly created Automotive Industry Financing
Program, which invested in General Motors, Inc. (GM), Chrysler
Holding LLC (Chrysler), GM’s finance subsidiary General Motors
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC, now Ally Financial), and Chrysler
Financial. 95 Through these equity investments, the Treasury
held considerable ownership of financial institutions and automobile firms.96
The Treasury, however, identified itself as a “reluctant
shareholder.”97 Under the CPP, the Treasury invested in financial
institutions mostly in the form of preferred stock with warrants,
which did not involve voting power except in certain specified
situations.98 Under other programs, although the Treasury occasionally held voting stock, it declared several principles to guide
its actions as a shareholder. For instance, it would not interfere
in the day-to-day management decisions and would dispose of its
investment as soon as practicable.99 In addition, it would exercise
its voting rights as a common shareholder only in respect of core
shareholder matters, such as board membership, amendments to
corporate charters or bylaws, mergers, liquidations, substantial
asset sales, and significant common stock issuances.100 In this way,
Targeted Investment Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment
-programs/tip/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NFS-SG92].
95 Auto Industry, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ini
tiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-programs/Pages/default
.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZZ2V-ACFP].
96 For more detailed summaries of these bailout investments, see Davidoff,
supra note 8, at 1736–56. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN.
L. REV. 463 (2009).
97 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, AGENCY
FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 41 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov
/about/organizational-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/OFS%20AFR%2009_24
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBE8-XLGC].
98 The Treasury, however, might exercise the voting rights when the amendments to the charter or certain transactions could adversely affect the Treasury’s
investment. Id. at 41.
99 Id. at 42
100 Id. The White House also declared similar sets of principles for the government’s management of automobile restructuring initiative. See Fact Sheet: Obama
94
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the Treasury again adopted a “shareholder restraint” policy: no
interference in daily management decisions, as well as restricted
voting rights limited to core shareholder issues.101 One commentator characterized the governance model adopted by the Treasury during this period as akin to a venture capital model: instead of
taking active control of the firm, the Treasury left the management of the rescued banks to continue to run their enterprises.102
The specific practice of government ownership during this
period contains at least three distinct models, as seen below.
2. AIG: A Majority Shareholder Model
AIG is a special example of government ownership during
the Financial Crisis due to the government’s majority voting right.
The Treasury bailed out AIG before the TARP came into place.103
It engaged in several rounds of equity investment in AIG from
September to November of 2008 and agreed on a restructuring plan
with AIG in September of 2010.104 Initially, the Treasury held only
non-voting preferred stock of AIG. 105 Through the subsequent
restructuring, however, the Treasury held up to 92 percent of AIG’s
common stock together with other preferred stock in AIG and its
two special purpose vehicles.106 Moreover, since AIG failed to pay
four quarterly dividends on preferred shares, in April 2010, the
Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative General Motors Restructuring,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re
leases/Pages/tg179.aspx [https://perma.cc/AK7J-BE5N].
101 Black, supra note 12, at 575.
102 Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 96, at 539–40. For a different observation,
see Davidoff, supra note 8, at 1767–72 (arguing that the government’s governance model during the bailouts did not resemble any of the private equity firms,
institutional investors, or venture capitalists).
103 Kimberley Amadeo, AIG Bailout, Cost, Timeline, Bonuses, Causes, Effects,
BALANCE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/aig-bailout-cost-timeline-bo
nuses-causes-effects-3305693 [https://perma.cc/X7ZR-UJ2X].
104 This debt and equity arrangement subsequently triggered the taking
lawsuits initiated by AIG’s shareholders against the government. For related
discussion, see generally Mahoney, supra note 10; Morris, supra note 10.
105 See Morris, supra note 10, at 908.
106 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, AGENCY
FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 30–31 (2011), http://www.treasury
.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-room/reports/agency_reports/Docu
ments /2011_OFS_AFR_11-11-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DDH-YVZN].
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Treasury exercised its right to appoint two additional directors to
the board of AIG.107 After a series of restructurings and dispositions,
the Treasury finally sold its shares of AIG in December 2012.108
To manage the AIG shares it held, the Treasury employed a
special trust vehicle. Instead of directly holding them, it established
the AIG Credit Facility Trust to hold AIG’s shares for the sole
benefit of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”).109
The purpose of this design was to prevent potential conflicts between the government’s role as both a regulator and an investor.110
According to the trust agreement, the government would not influence the voting rights vested by the stock, and the Trust would
leave the day-to-day management of AIG to its management.111
This was the only bailout case during the Financial Crisis in
which the Treasury adopted a trust structure to hold and manage the equities.112
3. Citigroup: A Major Shareholder Model
In contrast to AIG, Citigroup was a different case during the
Financial Crisis because the Treasury did not hold majority equities.113 The Treasury, pursuant to the CPP, invested $25 billion
in Citigroup in October 2008 in exchange for non-voting perpetual
preferred stock.114 It invested another $20 billion in December
2008 pursuant to the TIP in exchange for preferred stock.115 In
July 2009, in order to strengthen its capital, Citigroup agreed to
convert the preferred stock held by the Treasury, under the CPP,
107 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Names Two Appointees
to AIG’S Board of Directors (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-cen
ter/press-releases/Pages/tg623.aspx [https://perma.cc/9N2S-S7W9].
108 Investment in AIG: Program Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig/Pages
/status.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y24E-43T6].
109 See Morris, supra note 10, at 907–08.
110 AIG CREDIT FACILITY TRUST AGREEMENT 2 (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www
.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4TWX-SK9H].
111 Id. at 2. For a further introduction to this Trust Agreement, see Kahan
& Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12,
at 1351–52.
112 See Black, supra note 12, at 579–80.
113 See id. at 573.
114 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 33.
115 See id. at 56.
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into Citigroup’s common stock, which allocated 34 percent of Citigroup’s outstanding common stock to the Treasury.116 After this
conversion, Citigroup accelerated its repayment to the Treasury; it
repaid the Treasury’s TIP holding in December 2009. 117 The
Treasury also commenced selling its CPP holdings in April 2010,
and it completed the disposal of Citigroup’s common shares in
December 2010.118
In the Citigroup bailout, the Treasury, throughout the holding period, held equities in Citigroup directly.119 To prevent excessive government intervention, the Treasury agreed to limit its
exercise of voting power.120 This included an explicit promise in
the exchange agreement to vote in the same proportions as other
shareholders, except for major corporate matters (such as director election or removal, charter amendment, and major change
to the company).121
4. BoA: A Minority Shareholder Model
In contrast to AIG and Citigroup, the case of BoA was different since the Treasury held extremely little and non-voting equities in BoA.122 The Treasury, pursuant to the CPP, invested $15
billion in BoA’s preferred stock with warrants in October 2008, and
another $10 billion in January 2009.123 It further invested another $20 billion in BoA’s non-voting preferred stock pursuant to
the TIP in January 2009.124 These equities, however, only represented around 0.04 percent of BoA’s total outstanding shares
and bore no voting rights.125 Even if it exercised the warrants,
Citigroup, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (Nov. 6, 2009).
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 56.
118 Id. at 56.
119 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1300.
120 See id. at 1310.
121 See Citigroup, Inc., Amendment No. 5 (Form S-4), at 75–76 (July 17, 2009).
122 See William O. Fisher, When the Government Attempts to Change the Board,
Investors Should Know, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 543–44 (2013).
123 See id. at 544.
124 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 56.
125 David M. Barnes, Note, Shotgun Weddings: Director and Officer Fiduciary Duties in Government-Controlled and Partially-Nationalized Corporations,
63 VAND. L. REV. 1419, 1439 (2010).
116
117
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the Treasury would at most own around 5.2 percent of BoA’s
shares.126 Therefore, the Treasury’s role in BoA was even more
hands-off. BoA had repaid all of the Treasury’s investments by
December 2009.127
After the Financial Crisis was under control, the Treasury
kept its promise to liquidate its equity holding in banks. As of
December 31, 2018, the Treasury had collected $226.8 billion in
proceeds as opposed to the $205 billion original investment and
retains holdings in only three financial institutions as opposed
to the 707 initially funded institutions.128
5. Debates over Government Ownership in the United States
The Treasury’s ownership of banks during the Financial Crisis received strong criticism in the U.S. industries and academia.
The majority of commentators criticized that the Treasury’s bailout
was unnecessary and urged it to relinquish its equity holdings
as soon as possible. They grounded their criticism on three major concerns: the Treasury’s ignorance of taxpayers’ interests,129
misappropriation of incumbent shareholders’ interests, 130 and
inadequate protection of private shareholders’ interests in these
banks.131 In this Article, I will focus on the latter concern.132
The majority argued, in a nutshell, that when the government employs its ownership to influence corporate policy for its
own interest, shareholders risk diminished firm value. 133 This
See id. at 1434–40.
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 56.
128 See id. at 1.
129 See generally, e.g., Casey & Posner, supra note 26; Davidoff, supra note
8; Manns, supra note 8.
130 See generally, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 10.
131 See generally Mahoney, supra note 10; Morris, supra note 10.
132 A separate concern relates to the distortion of competition. For instance,
the Treasury’s bailout could result in adverse selection, where customers may
have more faith and confidence in those bailed-out banks because they have
the government’s backup. This could give them a competitive advantage over
their competitors that were “ironically safer prior to the bailout.” Verret, Treasury
Inc., supra note 6, at 306; see also Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice
Lens, supra note 7, at 1525.
133 See, e.g., Shahabian, supra note 11, at 352. And such negative effects arise
not only when the government holds majority shares (such as 79 percent in AIG
case) or substantial shares (such as 34 percent in the Citigroup case). Even
126
127
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argument tracks the conventional wisdom of the property rights
theory.134 The property rights theorists believe that governmentowned firms incur more serious moral hazard problems and
agency problems than private firms.135 In their view, a government
is essentially owned by all diffused taxpayers.136 Since no taxpayer
can sell his/her ownership of the government to express his/her
dissatisfaction, the government bureaucrats and politicians who
exercise the ownership are subject to less supervision.137 In the
context of the banking sector, this concern is greater for the following reasons. First, government bureaucrats and politicians can
disguise their political motivation more easily since the banking
sector is more complicated and outsiders may thus suffer more
serious informational asymmetry to supervise the quality of a
specific bank loan.138 Second, it takes more time to ascertain the
costs of any politically motivated loan since loans usually have a
longer period of maturity.139 Third, government bureaucrats and
when the government holds few shares or even non-voting shares (such as the
BoA case), these shareholdings, together with the government’s position as a
regulator, the statutes and regulations associated with the TARP program,
and the terms of bailout contract, etc., are sufficient to make the government
a controlling, or at least influential, shareholder. See Barnes, supra note 125,
at 1445–54; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 359–60; Verret, Treasury Inc., supra
note 6, at 299–307.
134 Related literature often cites Armen Alchian as the leading proponent of
the property right theory. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of
Property Rights, 30 II POLITICO 816 (1965); Enrico Perotti, State Ownership:
A Residual Role? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3407, 2004).
135 See Alchian, supra note 134, at 818–19.
136 See id. at 823.
137 Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian
Railroad, 88 J. POL. ECON. 958, 959 (1980); see also Alchian, supra note 134, at
822; Cotton M. Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84 J. POL. ECON.
1061, 1064 (1976) (arguing that, as it is difficult for Congress to define and
monitor social outputs, a government-owned enterprise may tend to spend costs
on those outputs visible to Congress, which could result in social inefficiency because government-owned enterprises may not necessarily achieve social objectives.); Perotti, supra note 134, at 4–5. For a more recent discussion, see, e.g.,
Eduardo Levy Yeyati et al., A Reappraisal of State-Owned Banks, 7 ECONOMIA
209, 209 (2007).
138 Serdar Dinc, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on GovernmentOwned Banks in Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 454 (2005).
139 Id.
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politicians can divert funds more easily since the banking sector
operates across the whole economy rather than in a defined industry.140 Finally, government bureaucrats and politicians may
possess more control over the banking sector due to the higher
entry barriers of this sector.141
To be fair, there remain some theories supporting government ownership of banks.142 For instance, the regulatory theory
argues that government ownership of banks can facilitate banking regulation and supervision.143 In this view, the government may
have limited ability to design complete regulations ex ante.144 If the
regulator cannot control misbehaviors of private banks through
ex ante regulation, government ownership may vest the regulator
with direct control over these banks and thus supplement incomplete regulation. 145 Nevertheless, this regulatory function of government ownership largely depends on a benevolent government;
the property rights theory, based on the difficulties of supervising
the government, challenges this fundamental assumption.146
Id.
Id.
142 For a summary of these theories, see Perotti, supra note 134, at 4–5, 8–9;
Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 218–21.
143 Perotti, supra note 134, at 5.
144 See generally Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory
and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1127 (1997); David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information and Incentives (Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 2196, 1987).
145 See Perotti, supra note 134, at 5. Perotti, however, rebuts that private
ownership only reduces the government’s discretion rather than deprives the
government of discretion. With the power of legislation, the regulator can always
change laws to regulate private sectors and manage their misbehavior. Id. at
11–12.
146 Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265,
266 (2002); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms,
109 Q.J. ECON. 995, 995 (1994); Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 221–23.
Another theory supporting government ownership of banks is the developmental theory. It argues that when a government cannot create a friendly environment for private investment, direct government ownership in production
can be a substitute. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State versus Private Ownership, 12
J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 147–48 (1998); Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., The Role of the State
in Financial Markets, WORLD BANK ANN. CONF. ON DEV. ECON. 1992 at 19, 19
(1993), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/239281468741290885/pdf
/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCP3-GSTE]. In banking sectors, for countries
where economic institutions have not sufficiently developed for private banks
140
141
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According to a majority of opinions in the United States, the
U.S. experience during the Financial Crisis supported the property
rights theory from at least four interrelated aspects.147 First, the
government does not maximize shareholders’ interest due to its
different definition of utility with other shareholders.148 It might
use shareholders’ investments for social or political purposes rather
than for economic gains.149 Several instances during the Financial Crisis evidenced this concern. For example, it was reported that
the President and Congress continually pressed government-owned
banks, including Citigroup and BoA, to increase lending to small
businesses, restrain actions against struggling homeowners, and
maintain specific mortgage loan modification programs.150 These
actions might achieve the social utility pursued by the government,
but at the same time they may diminish the value of shareholders’ investment.
to play the crucial role of financial development for economic growth, the government could step in by creating government-owned banks to fill this gap and
improve the general welfare. After the Financial Crisis, some commentators
further highlighted the countercyclical role of government-owned banks. See also
Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza, Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior, 93
ECON. LETTER 220, 220–21 (2006); Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 224, 231–32.
See generally Ata Can Bertay et al., Bank Ownership and Credit over the Business
Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks Less Procyclical? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6110, 2012); Martin Cihak & Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Rethinking
the State’s Role in Finance 13–15 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No.
WPS 6400, 2013); Eva Gutierrez et al., Development Banks: Role and Mechanisms to Increase their Efficiency 8–9 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper
No. WPS 5729, 2011). This development view, however, might sound too aggressive in the United States considering that the United States has a relatively
developed financial sector. For the studies of this development view in the U.S.
context, see generally Schneiberg, supra note 86.
147 See Templin, supra note 12, at 1198.
148 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 316.
149 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1306, 1318–19; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 360–63.
150 See Barnes, supra note 125, at 1451; Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 410; Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1302–04; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 362.
In the bailout of GM and Chrysler, it was reported as well that Congress pressed
these two firms to prevent the closure of GM and Chrysler dealers. Kahan &
Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 410; Kahan & Rock, When the
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1304–05; Shahabian,
supra note 11, at 362–63.
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Second, the government is susceptible to political interference from different interest groups. Government ownership thus
invites political intervention into the corporate decisions of government-owned firms. An example was the government’s exercise
of influence to alter the board or management of TARP-supported
financial institutions. For instance, it was reported that the Treasury, through its majority voting power derived from its bailout,
influenced the restructuring of AIG’s board.151 This action might
meet the expectation of the public and restore the public’s confidence in the government, but it does not necessarily serve the
best interests of the rescued banks and their shareholders.
Third, the government is inefficient in managing banks.
Government bureaucrats might not possess the requisite market
expertise to manage private banks efficiently. In particular, for
countries like the United States where the government has long
refused to involve itself in firms’ operation, government bureaucrats can hardly have adequate experience to handle corporate
affairs. This could lead to waste and inefficiency. For instance, the
Congressional Oversight Panel studied the Treasury’s investment
during the Financial Crisis and found that the Treasury generally overpaid for all of the assets in the study.152 This evidences
the Treasury’s inefficiency in the business world.
Fourth, the government has conflicting interests. In government-owned firms, the government has a dual role as both the
regulator and an investor. To the extent that the government’s
investment interest in the firms affects its exercise of governmental authority, the conflict of interest arises.153 For instance,
in the bailout of Fannie Mae, it was reported that the Treasury
blocked Fannie Mae’s contemplated sale of $3 billion in tax credits to Goldman Sachs and Berkshire Hathaway because it feared
that it would lose tax revenues should the buyers use the credits to
offset their taxes.154 Such conflicting interests can also conversely
benefit the government-owned banks in the sacrifice of the quality of regulations. For instance, during the bailout, the Treasury
Fisher, supra note 122, at 536–43.
See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 9.
153 See Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2919.
154 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1305–06.
151
152
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issued a series of notices granting AIG a “special tax break,” which
acknowledged AIG’s continued use of its net operating losses in
the future.155 These notices arguably distorted section 382 of the
Tax Code.156 Regardless in which direction, the regulator fails to
perform effective supervision due to its conflicts of interest.157
To be fair, not all the voices in the United States oppose
government ownership of banks. Benjamin Templin, for instance,
applies the stakeholder theory to justify the “policy-driven management” of the government.158 He noted that even in ordinary
firms, as reflected in the stakeholder theory, not all shareholders
are interested in maximizing the value of firms.159 To mitigate
potential negative effects associated with the stakeholder theory,
he proposed some sets of institutional norms to permit the use of
government ownership while preserving free market principles.160
Barbara Black proposed a more aggressive model of government
Kevin Roose, Bailout Watchdogs Criticize A.I.G. Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03
/12/bailout-watchdogs-criticize-a-i-g-tax-breaks/ [https://perma.cc/FW86-RHS5].
156 For related criticism, see generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen,
Can the Treasury Exempt its Own Companies from Tax?: The $45 Billion GM
NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y 1 (2011) (arguing that Section 382 of the Tax Code prevents an acquirer from using the target’s net operating losses). If the Treasury sold the stock it holds in bailout firms, such as
AIG or GM, it should trigger this section. Nevertheless, the Treasury issued a
series of notices interpreting that section 382 would not apply in its cases and
AIG and GM would be entitled to use its net operating losses after the Treasury sold its stock.
157 Moreover, some commentators also cautioned that because government
ownership to a certain extent implies some form of government guarantee, the
private sector will have no incentive to monitor these government-owned firms
as well. In the end, none of the private and public sectors provide effective supervision. Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Corporate Governance in Finance: Concepts and International Observations, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE
ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 17, 39–41 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2002).
158 See generally Templin, supra note 12, at 1185.
159 Id.
160 Templin raised three core principles for government ownership. First,
there must be political insulation of the investment decision and management of
assets by creating an independent investment authority. Second, there must
be ethical walls between the investment authority and the regulatory agencies
overseeing private enterprise. Third, the investment authority must act as a
prudent investor with the goal of maximizing the return on investment. Id. at
1131, 1203–14.
155
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ownership.161 She opposed the Treasury’s “hands-off” practice during the Financial Crisis162 and suggested that the government
should be actively involved in corporate governance affairs when
it is a substantial shareholder.163 She expected that, unlike ordinary business directors, government directors could present the
government’s perspectives and concerns to management and other
members of the board.164 Emma C. Jordan followed this line of
reasoning and suggested that the government should appoint government directors with a history of public service to the recipients’
boards on a proportional level to the amount of invested funds.165
These arguments for government ownership of banks, however,
are not the mainstream opinion.
D. Summary
To summarize, the majority opinion in the United States
opposes government ownership of banks. Templin offered a political economy viewpoint for explaining why government ownership is not well-accepted in the United States.166 This viewpoint
observed that the U.S. economy is a typical liberal market economy,
which is more associated with neoliberalism and a free market
approach.167 In his view, it would be adverse to this traditional
path if the U.S. government re-establishes some form of ownership
of banks, an interventionist approach that is less compatible with
the free market approach.168
Black, supra note 12, at 569.
Id.
163 Id. at 565. Specifically, she proposes that the government should: first, use
its power to nominate and run its own nominees for the board of directors, who
would serve on the board as representatives of the government in order to represent the interests of the U.S. taxpayer; second, select at least some high-level
Treasury officials to serve as directors when it has the power to elect or appoint;
and third, regularly provide the general public with clear, specific statements
about the government’s acts and their effect on the corporation.
164 Id. at 594.
165 Emma Coleman Jordan, A Fair Deal for Taxpayer Investments: Public
Directors are Necessary to Restore Trust and Accountability at Companies
Rescued by the U.S. Government, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 16, 2009),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/regulation/report/2009/09/16/6608/a
-fair-deal-for-taxpayer-investments [https://perma.cc/Z3KB-JJZ4].
166 Templin, supra note 12, at 1135–37.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1132–52.
161
162
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Nevertheless, I wish to revisit government ownership of
banks in the U.S. context through a more balanced lens. Admittedly, government ownership introduces enhanced government intervention. The government, however, is not doomed to exercise
such intervention in a negative way as feared by the property
rights theorists. After all, the banking sector is a regulated industry,
which implies that this sector needs some level of government
intervention. With proper institutional designs, the perceived
downsides of government ownership might be controllable, and the
government can thus exercise its ownership in a positive way
that supplements its regulation and supervision of banks. I will
examine them more closely in the following two Parts.
II. THE MYTH OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN THE U.S. CONTEXT
The majority opinion opposes government ownership of
banks mainly because it distrusts the government.169 A government, however, is not always untrustworthy. In theory, a government can be either a “helping hand” or a “grabbing hand.” In the
real world, whether the U.S. government is a helping or grabbing
hand is not a problem of black or white, but a problem of degree.
A government could be a helping hand on some occasions and a
grabbing hand on other occasions. Specifically, government bureaucrats and politicians acting on behalf of the government could
pursue their own political agendas in some cases while serving
the public good to society in other cases. Consequently, the bright
sides and dark sides of government ownership could coexist and
interplay with each other.170 What we need to ascertain is, after
accounting for all these positive and negative effects, whether government ownership, in the end, brings premiums or discounts to the
bank as well as society. This is essentially an empirical question.
To ascertain this question in the U.S. context, I will reference available empirical findings that analyze the effects of government ownership of banks and apply these observations to the
United States. I will demonstrate that the United States, unlike
other jurisdictions in the world, has antidotal institutions to control
the negative effects of government ownership. In other words,
the majority view could be exaggerating these negative effects.
169
170

Black, supra note 12, at 593–94.
Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 246.
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A. Empirical Evidence of Government Ownership of Banks:
Developed Countries Exception?
Methodologically, since the U.S. banking sector is the subject of this Article, I should inquire into those U.S.-specific studies that observe the effect of government ownership of U.S. banks.
Such studies, however, hardly exist due to the rare precedent and
short implementation of this practice in the United States. Consequently, I instead adopt a comparative approach that turns to
cross-countries evidence for shedding some light here.
Empirical studies in the early 2000s almost all consistently
found that government ownership of banks correlated with enhanced financial risks and lower financial and economic development. For instance, Gerard Caprio and Maria Soledad Martinez
Peria, based on data of banks in 64 countries over the period of
1980–1997, found that government ownership of banks posed
danger to financial stability and thus significantly increased the
likelihood and fiscal costs of a banking crisis.171 Rafael La Porta
et al. found, based on data of government-owned banks from 92
countries around the world, that government ownership of banks
in 1970 was associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower subsequent growth in per capita income.172
James R. Barth et al., based on data of bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries, also found that government ownership
of banks was positively associated with the level of nonperforming
loans in an economy.173 According to these studies, government
ownership of banks is negative.174
Gerard Caprio & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Avoiding Disasters: Policies
to Reduce the Risk of Banking Crises 8–15 (World Bank mimeo & Egyptian Ctr.
for Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 47, 2000).
172 La Porta et al., supra note 146, at 265.
173 James R. Barth et al., Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works
Best?, 13 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 205, 240, 245 (2004). That said, they did not
find evidence suggesting that government ownership of banks was positively
associated with bank development, efficiency, or stability.
174 See also Dinc, supra note 138, at 475–76; Giuliano Iannotta et al., The
Impact of Government Ownership on Bank Risk, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
152, 154, 169, 175 (2013); Alejandro Micco et al., Bank Ownership and Performance: Does Politics Matter?, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 219, 227–28 (2007); Paola
Sapienza, The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, 72 J. FIN. ECON.
357, 359–60 (2004); James R. Barth et al., Banking Systems around the Globe: Do
171
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A closer examination of empirical evidence, however, challenges the above general finding. The negative effects of government-owned banks mostly appeared in developing countries
while disappearing in developed countries. For instance, Rafael
La Porta et al. found that the negative effects associated with
government ownership of banks were more serious in relatively
poor countries, relatively financially underdeveloped countries, and
countries with poor protection of property rights.175 Dinc, based
on data of banks in 36 countries (19 emerging countries and 17
developed countries), found that government-owned banks significantly increased their lending in election years, which suggested
that political motivations influenced their actions; however, in developed countries, he failed to detect such election-year increase.176
Alejandro Micco et al., based on financial information from 179
countries, also found that government-owned banks in developing
countries were associated with lower profitability and higher costs
than their private counterparts, and such performance differences
increased during election years; but again, they failed to find any
strong correlation in industrial countries.177 In a country-specific
study, Yener Altunbas et al., based on data of German banks, failed
to find strong evidence showing that private banks outperformed
government-owned banks.178 These empirical findings suggest that
the negative effects of government ownership of banks are associated with the development status of individual countries.179
These findings lead us to question whether there are some
country-specific institutional factors that may mitigate the negative effects of government ownership of banks. La Porta et al.
suggested that this difference might result from the better access
Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability? 27 (The World Bank
Dev. Res. Group, Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2325, 2000); Alejandro Rainer
Haselmann et al., Real Effects of Bank Governance: Bank Ownership and Corporate Innovation (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. DP7488, 2009).
175 La Porta et al., supra note 146, at 290.
176 Dinc, supra note 138, at 475–76.
177 Micco et al., supra note 174, at 227–32.
178 See Yener Altunbas et al., Bank Ownership and Efficiency, 33 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 926, 936, 938, 944 (2001).
179 In fact, recent empirical evidence also presents some results favorable
to government ownership of banks. See, e.g., Chung-Hua Shen et al., The
Government’s Role in Government-owned Banks, 45 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 307,
319–27, 338–39 (2013); Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 237–44.
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to foreign capital in richer countries.180 Micco et al. instead offered
two possible explanations. First, high-income countries might be
better equipped to deal with distortions arising from government
ownership of banks; therefore, governance issues are less serious in
industrial countries.181 Second, in industrial countries, governmentowned banks have ceased to play a developmental role; therefore,
their actions mimic the behavior of private banks.182 Dinc, in contrast, considered that his findings did not result from better legal
and political institutions in developed countries, but simply from
some methodological problems.183 Nevertheless, none of them provided further studies to support their explanations.
The above empirical findings suggest that the hypothesis
held by the mainstream opinion is flawed. Government ownership
of banks is not doomed to produce negative results in the United
States. In the following parts, I will demonstrate that the United
States may possess some antidotal institutions to mitigate these
perceived negative effects.
B. Government Ownership of Banks in the U.S. Context
1. The Potential Exaggeration of the Perceived Negative
Effects
As mentioned above, opponents of government ownership
of banks in the United States draw on the property rights theory
to justify their position.184 According to them, the government is
unable to maximize shareholders’ interests, falls prey to political
influence, behaves inefficiently, and involves conflicts of interest.185
Its decisions in government-owned firms may be politically determined and susceptible to capture.186
La Porta et al., supra note 146, at 290.
Micco et al., supra note 174, at 227.
182 Id.
183 Dinc, supra note 138, at 476 (arguing that the lack of an election-year effect
in developed countries could be because government-owned banks are owned by
regional or local governments in these countries. Therefore, his survey, which
focuses on central elections instead of local elections, could not detect any electionyear effect).
184 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text.
186 Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis,
36 J. CORP. L. 309, 312 (2011).
180
181
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These, however, concerns could be exaggerated. As Mariana
Pargendler pointed out, although there is a difference between
government bureaucrats and private businesspersons in terms
of their motives, it is often easy to overstate the extent of such
difference.187 The opportunism of government-owned firms may
well mirror that of private controlling shareholders,188 which may,
in turn, mirror that of managers.189 In other words, failure to maximize firm profits is not unique to the government owner.190 “[T]oo
much emphasis on the differences between private and public
control of enterprise has largely obscured their similarities.”191
Moreover, mainstream opinion might also overlook the interplay between government supervision vis-à-vis government
ownership and thus exaggerate the negative effect of the latter.
Notably, the banking sector, the subject of this Article, is a highly
regulated sector that is subject to heavy governmental regulation
and supervision.192 Moreover, the banking regulator often has considerable discretion to promulgate new banking regulations and
supervise banks as it deems proper.193 Accordingly, with or without ownership, the government, as the regulator, already possesses
considerable authority to intervene in banks’ corporate decisions.
For this reason, the perceived negative effects associated with government ownership, if any, could be marginal.
The controversial merger between BoA and Merrill Lynch
during the Financial Crisis can illustrate this point.194 When BoA’s
Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2923.
Id. at 2923–24.
189 Id. at 2923.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s Intervention: Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law? The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup, and General
Motors, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 50, 53–55, 98 n.280 (2011).
193 See generally id.
194 As a brief background note, the Treasury held a very small amount of BoA
stock during the Financial Crisis. In September 2008, Merrill Lynch faced serious liquidity problems and was at the edge of collapse. The Fed successfully
facilitated a $50 billion merger between BoA and Merrill Lynch to solve this
problem on September 15, 2008, pending the shareholder vote. In the following
three months, however, the value of Merrill Lynch’s assets depreciated significantly, and this fourth-quarter loss, which occurred after the conclusion of the
merger agreement, caused BoA to consider invoking the material adverse change
187
188
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management considered terminating the deal, the Federal Reserve
threatened to use its authority as a banking regulator to remove
BoA’s senior management and board members.195 Some commentators took this case as an example illustrating how government
ownership of a firm, despite how limited such ownership is, could
intervene in the corporate decisions of that firm.196 However, the
Federal Reserve’s threat was real not because of its ownership of
BoA; as a matter of fact, at that time, the Federal Reserve had no
voting power in BoA to vote out the management and board members. 197 Rather, what scared BoA’s board was the Federal Reserve’s supervisory power to remove the management of banks.198
With or without government ownership, the political interference
that concerned the property rights theorists had been in place.199
In this sense, the magnitude of additional negative effects that
government ownership per se could add is doubtful.
Some empirical studies on the efficiency of governmentowned firms can further support the above observation. In general,
most empirical studies report that government-owned firms are
less efficient than their private counterparts.200 Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence on the performance of government-owned firms
clause in the merger agreement to terminate the deal. For an introduction of this
deal, see Barnes, supra note 125, at 1422–31; see also Kerr, supra note 192, at 49.
195 Federal banking agencies are entitled to remove any institutional affiliated party from office or prohibit any further participation by such party, in any
manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution. The
Federal Reserve falls within the definition of “federal banking agency,” and any
director, officer, and employee falls within the definition of “institutional affiliated
party” here. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(u), (z) (2012); § 1818(e)(1).
196 See generally Barnes, supra note 125; Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice
during a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661 (2010).
197 Fisher, supra note 122, at 558.
198 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 38(f)(2)(F) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831o(f)(2)(F) (2012)).
199 For similar observations, see Fisher, supra note 122, at 543–52.
200 Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2958; see also Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan
R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises, 32
J.L. & ECON. 1, 17 (1989); Anthony Boardman et al., The Price of Government
Ownership: A Study of the Domtar Takeover, 31 J. PUB. ECON. 269, 270 (1986);
William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 380 (2001); Mary M.
Shirley & Patrick Walsh, Public v. Private Ownership: The Current State of the
Debate (World Bank Policy Res., Working Paper No. 2420, 2001).
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in a regulated environment is surprisingly different. For instance,
Scott E. Atkinson and Robert Halvorsen analyzed the data of
U.S. electric utilities and found that government-owned and private firms were equally cost-inefficient.201 Catherine C. Eckel and
Theo Vermaelen analyzed data of governmental purchase of stock
in private Canadian firms and found that private shareholders
suffered losses from government’s purchase of shares only in unregulated industries.202 Eckel and Vermaelen offered two explanations of their findings. One is that a government’s regulation
through internal direct ownership is less costly than external
regulation.203 The other is that government ownership might not
increase agency costs in regulated firms because existing regulations have already incorporated these costs.204 These inferences
support my above arguments.
To be sure, government ownership still differs from government regulation and supervision. The extent, however, might
be limited. The mainstream opinion could exaggerate the negative
effects associated with government ownership.
C. Antidotal Institutions in the United States
Even if some negative effects associated with government
ownership of banks remain, they are likely to be minimal or controllable in the United States. At least three major U.S. institutions can mitigate the negative effects of government ownership:
the competitive financial market, developed financial system, and
advanced political institutions.
1. The United States Has a Competitive Financial Market
To begin, the United States possesses a competitive financial
market. Market competition is always a crucial corporate governance institution.205 In a competitive financial market, investors
201 Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, The Relative Efficiency of Public
and Private Firms in a Regulated Environment: The Case of U.S. Electric Utilities,
29 J. PUB. ECON. 281, 285 (1986).
202 Eckel & Vermaelen, supra note 1, at 399–400.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK
OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371, 377–79 (Claude Menard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2005).
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and outsiders can easily measure the economic performance of
government-owned banks. If government bureaucrats in charge
of government-owned banks are inefficient, the threat of competition by private counterparts will reveal such inefficiency and force
them to improve their efficiency. Competition can also constrain
the politicians and government bureaucrats who operate government-owned banks from pursuing their own political agendas or
personal interest.
The above inference finds a comparative piece of empirical
support. Marcia Million Cornett et al. studied the data of East Asian
banks during and after the East Asian financial crisis and found
that government-owned banks performed more poorly than private
banks in 1997 to 2000, but such difference disappeared in 2001–
2004.206 They interpreted this change as consistent with a life-cycle
model, under which the increasing globalization of financial services
brought about competition and thus pressured government-owned
banks to improve their banking policy, which, in turn, enhanced
the performance of government-owned banks.207 This empirical
finding suggests that market competition may control government inefficiency.
2. The United States Has a Highly Developed Financial
System
The United States also possesses a highly developed financial system.208 A highly developed financial system contains
more readily available financial techniques, experienced talents,
206 See generally Marcia Million Cornett et al., The Impact of State Ownership
on Performance Differences in Privately-Owned versus State-Owned Banks: An
International Comparison, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 74 (2010).
207 Id. As a general matter, Douglas W. Caves and Laurits R. Christensen,
who compared the performance of government-owned Canadian railroads and
private railroads in a competitive environment, found that both perform equally
well. They explain this finding by stating that market competition may overcome
inefficiency resulting from government ownership. Caves & Christensen, supra
note 137, at 958. Other literature also found that government-owned firms may
be as efficient as private firms in competitive environments, provided that there
is sufficient competition between these firms and that the government does not
provide discriminatory regulations and subsidies in favor of government-owned
firms. Boardman & Vining, supra note 200, at 7.
208 See generally Herbert L. Baer & Larry R. Mote, The United States Financial
System, in BANKING STRUCTURES IN MAJOR COUNTRIES 469 (George G. Kaufman
ed., 1992).
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and market rules, which can field the inexperienced government
bureaucrats necessary to exercise government ownership. It would
also be easier for government bureaucrats to mimic their private
counterparts, which reduces the difference in expertise between
private and government-owned banks.
This inference also finds a comparative piece of empirical
support. As mentioned above, La Porta et al. found that government
ownership of banks caused more adverse effects on economic growth
in financially underdeveloped countries than in financially developed countries.209 Tobias Korner and Isabel Schnabel further
elaborated this point. Their studies, based on a sample of eighty-two
countries, showed that the impact of government ownership of
banks on economic growth depended strongly on a country’s degree
of financial development.210 In highly developed financial systems,
as measured by a country’s private credits (i.e., the value of credits
of financial intermediaries to private sectors divided by GDP),
they did not find any significant effect of government ownership
on growth.211 At even higher levels of financial development, the
marginal effect of government ownership even became positive and
large.212 According to Korner and Schnabel, a well-developed financial system possesses existing high financial standards, such as
ready-made new techniques, well-trained job-market candidates,
experienced employees, good regulation, prudential supervision,
and adequate competition.213 These standards can mitigate the
principal-agent problem within government-owned banks and thus
benefit these banks.214
3. The United States Has More Advanced Political Institutions
Finally, the United States possesses more advanced political
institutions. One major concern regarding government ownership
relates to the distrust of government bureaucrats and politicians.215
La Porta et al., supra note 146, at 290.
See Tobias Korner & Isabel Schnabel, Public Ownership of Banks and
Economic Growth: The Impact of Country Heterogeneity, 19 ECON. OF TRANSITION
407, 434–35 (2011).
211 See generally id. at 420–22.
212 Id. at 420–21.
213 Id. at 435.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 409–12.
209
210
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Such concerns can be largely mitigated if a country possesses relatively advanced and transparent legal and political institutions
that may supervise government bureaucrats and politicians.216
Even though U.S. society distrusts its politicians,217 this country
has far more advanced political institutions that are relatively
transparent and institutionalized, which results in relatively less
corruption than many other countries. 218 With these advanced
political institutions to hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable, the U.S. banking sector should be subject to a less negative
effect associated with government ownership of banks.
This inference again finds a comparative piece of empirical
support. Korner and Schnabel also found that the impact of government ownership on economic growth depended on the quality
of a country’s political institutions and governance structures.219
In countries with high-quality political institutions, as measured
by democracy indices, assessments of political rights, governance
indicators, and corruption indices, government ownership of banks
does not influence economic growth at all.220 Their explanation
of this finding is that good political institutions may mitigate the
agency problem between taxpayers and politicians, which controls
the abuse of government-owned banks by politicians.221
To summarize the above, as a well-developed country with
adequate antidotal institutions, the United States, in fact, possesses
some born advantages to adopt government ownership of banks.
Indeed, government ownership of banks may incur some negative
effects. Nevertheless, many institutions as suggested above may
alleviate these concerns. Unlike many other developing countries,
the United States possesses all the necessary mitigation institutions: a competitive financial market, a developed financial system,
Id.
See, e.g., Uri Friedman, Trust is Collapsing in America, ATLANTIC (Jan. 21,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trust-trump
-america-world/550964/ [https://perma.cc/VML9-7CV8].
218 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 25,
2017), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index
_2016 [https://perma.cc/T46J-4UGX] (finding that the United States ranked
eighteenth out of 176 countries in terms of corruption).
219 Korner & Schnabel, supra note 210, at 435, 439.
220 Id. at 422–25.
221 Id. at 435.
216
217
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and advanced legal and political institutions. As a developed country with these institutions, government ownership of banks per se
may be less detrimental in the United States. The experience of
RFC investments and the CIC case, under which the government
generally refrained from intervening in the firms’ daily operational
decisions, may also provide some comfort to U.S. society.222
The above inferences can also find support from a U.S.specific empirical study. Stacey R. Kole and J. Harold Mulherin
conducted an empirical study of APC companies which were
government-owned during the post–World War II period.223 They
found that the performance of APC companies was not significantly
different from that of their private counterparts.224 This finding,
which is precious considering the rare government ownership
practice in the United States, shows that government ownership
in the United States does not necessarily bear the negative effects
normally attributed to government ownership.
III. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND BANK GOVERNANCE IN THE
POST–FINANCIAL CRISIS ERA
On the other hand, government ownership may have particular merits in the banking sector considering that it can promote
sound corporate governance of banks, especially in improving poor
risk management practices.225
Corporate governance of banks has a different face from that
of general firms.226 In the post–Financial Crisis era, bank governance increasingly emphasizes a robust risk management system
to protect creditors’ interests as well as the stability of individual
Broome, supra note 65, at 433.
See generally Kole & Mulherin, supra note 74.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 1, 16.
226 Considering that different industries have their own characteristics that
call for different sets of governance codes, a sector-specific study of corporate
governance is warranted. Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance of Banks after the
Financial Crisis, in Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-crisis Analysis
338, 344 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 181/2011,
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1918851 (emphasizing that there is a “clear trend toward sector-specific corporate governance and
governance codes”).
222
223
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banks and the whole financial system. In this Part, I will demonstrate how government ownership of banks, coupled with the use
of government directors, can help to build robust risk management in banks.
A. Banks Are Special
Banks are special for at least five major reasons.227 First,
banks serve the function of liquidity production by engaging in
maturity mismatch activities, i.e., borrowing short and lending long;
this causes their assets to be largely comprised of liabilities as
opposed to equities.228 Accordingly, unlike general firms where
shareholders are the ones having the largest interest in the firm,
in banks, creditors also have considerable stakes, and their interests
must be duly taken into account.229 The problem of bank runs,
which erode the liquidity of banks and accelerate their collapse,
further underscores the importance of maintaining the trust and
confidence of public creditors in banks.230
227 Plenty of literature has documented many features of banks which justify a different regulatory regime. See, e.g., Caprio & Levine, supra note 157, at
27–39; Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of
Banks, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 97–99 (2003) (summarizing four characteristics of
banks, including the liquidity production role of banks, the deposit insurance
fund, the conflict between fixed claimants and shareholders, and asset structure and loyalty problems); Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks:
A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence 7–11 (World Bank Policy Res.,
Working Paper No. 3404, 2004) (summarizing three characteristics of banks,
including that banks are opaque and heavily regulated and widely involve government ownership); Peter O. Mulbert, Corporate Governance of Banks after the
Financial Crisis—Theory, Evidence, Reforms 10–14 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 151/2010, 2010) (summarizing seven special
attributes of banks, including (1) banks serve a liquidity producing function;
(2) banks are highly leveraged; (3) banks are notoriously opaque; (4) banks largely
engage in business with each other; (5) banks holding a substantial portfolio of
derivatives and securities with embedded options subject themselves to sharp
changes in their risk profiles; (6) banks are subject to the creditor runs problem; and (7) banks are heavily regulated and supervised).
228 Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 97; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 10.
229 Mulbert, supra note 227, at 15–16.
230 To elaborate, the liabilities of banks are mostly short-term, either on demand (e.g., deposits) or in an extremely short term (e.g., repo). When there is panic
which causes creditors to lose confidence in a specific bank, their rational choice
will be to withdraw the lending as soon as possible. This is a prisoner’s dilemma
problem which results in runs problems and serves no one’s best interest. For
an introduction of the runs problem, see RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW
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Second, banks are subject to several types of systemic risks.
Banks engage in similar activities, which expose them to the risk
of correlation, that is, the failure of any of those activities could
simultaneously harm all entities in the financial system.231 In addition, banks largely engage in business with each other, which
exposes all of them to the risk of connectedness, meaning the failure
of one bank could harm all its counterparties and thus spread the
negative effects of one single failure to the whole financial system.232 The risk of connectedness may further evolve into the risk
of contagion, that is, one single failure may send a strong negative signal to market participants and cause them to panic.233 They
may thus withdraw their lending all of a sudden, which results in
the bank runs problem.234 In sum, any one single failure case can
shake the stability of the whole financial system. This systemic risk
concern further leads to the notorious too-big-to-fail problem.
Third, banks are closely connected with the economic development of a society. They play the intermediary role by receiving the household savings in forms of deposits, mutual funds,
etc., accumulating them into investment funds and investing them
in forms of loans or equity. This series of activities ultimately
transforms household savings into investment in businesses,
which creates the flow of money and thus promotes economic
development.235 Through this process, banks also serve the money creation function. They create extra money in addition to that
actually issued by the government, which again promotes economic development.236 The collapse of one bank will naturally
cause negative effects on the flow of money, and the function of
money creation, and thus harm the economy of a country.237 Accordingly, banks not only create profits for their investors but also
play a public role.238
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 49–51 (5th ed., 2013); Macey & O’Hara, supra note
227, at 97; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 12–13.
231 Hal S. Scott, How to Improve Five Important Areas of Financial Regulation, in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH
LEGAL REFORM 114, 118–19 (Robert E. Litan ed., 2011).
232 Id. at 114–16.
233 Id. at 116–18.
234 Id.
235 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 230, at 39–40.
236 See id. at 51–54.
237 Scott, supra note 231, at 116–18.
238 Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 102.
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Fourth, banks are notoriously opaque in terms of their balance sheets, quality of loans, etc. This opaqueness can be attributed
to several factors. For instance, the activities of banks, such as
loans, derivatives, securitizations, etc., are relatively too complicated for outsiders to assess the quality of these activities. 239
The multilayer organizational structure within a banking conglomerate, especially a multinational one, also makes it more
challenging for the central decision body to integrate necessary
information to make a comprehensive judgment.240 The opaqueness
of banks makes it difficult for bank insiders to understand the
real status of that bank, as well as for outside investors, stakeholders, and regulators to monitor that bank.241
Finally, banks are heavily regulated, which creates unique
governance issues. For instance, the deposit insurance mechanism
creates the well-known moral hazard problem, under which depositors have little incentive to monitor banks.242 Capital adequacy requirements also provide incentives for shareholders to
undertake excessive risks because higher capital requirements
cause shareholders to ask for higher investment premiums.243 This
induces management to take a riskier business strategy to satisfy
the needs of shareholders.244 In sum, while banking regulations
and supervisions address some problems unique to banks, they
also create new challenges to the corporate governance of banks.
B. Pictures of Bank Governance
The special characteristics of banks mentioned above imply
that their corporate governance should differ from that of general
firms.245 One major difference is that bank governance should
Mulbert, supra note 227, at 11.
Hopt, supra note 226, at 347.
241 See Caprio & Levine, supra note 157, at 29–35; Hopt, supra note 226,
at 347; Levine, supra note 227, at 7–9.
242 Hopt, supra note 226, at 352; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 97;
Levine, supra note 227, at 10–11.
243 Levine, supra note 227, at 10–11.
244 Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk
Taking, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 206 (2009); Mulbert, supra note 227, at 16–19.
245 See, e.g., Caprio & Levine, supra note 157, at 27–39; Hopt, supra note 226,
at 352–53; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 99–102; Levine, supra note
227, at 7–11; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 14–21. Cf. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
239
240
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place greater emphasis on the creditors’ interests; creditors are a
crucial group of stakeholders due to the high leverage of banks.246
The agency conflict between creditors and shareholders is especially severe.247 Nevertheless, the vehicles available for addressing creditors’ interests are limited.
Shareholders will hardly consider interests other than their
own; protected by limited liability, they pursue more risks than
creditors. 248 Therefore, entrusting the supervision of banks to
shareholders cannot adequately incentivize management to consider the risk control of banks. Quite the opposite, it may induce the
management to pursue a profit-seeking and risk-pursuing direction. 249 Without adequate risk-control incentive, empowering
shareholders could ultimately endanger the survival of individual banks as well as the whole financial system and economy.250
Creditors, who have substantial stakes in banks, can hardly
monitor as well. For one thing, most creditors of banks are the
diffused public, which has neither the ability nor the incentive to
monitor banks.251 Deposit insurance further introduces the moral
hazard problem to creditors and thus weakens their incentive to
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”), OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 11 (2004) (considering itself containing principles applicable to
firms “both financial and non-financial”). Nevertheless, OECD also acknowledges that bank governance may be different in the more important role of
stakeholders (i.e., depositors), implicit or explicit government guarantees with
respect to classes of liabilities, and serious externality problems, which justify
more intensive government involvement. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: KEY FINDINGS AND MAIN MESSAGES 12–13 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS].
246 Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 99.
247 Hopt, supra note 226, at 352–53; see also Dirk Heremans & Katrien Bosquet, The Future of Law and Finance after the Financial Crisis: New Perspectives
on Regulation and Corporate Governance for Banks, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1551,
1565–73 (2011); Monika Marcinkowska, Corporate Governance in Banks: Problems
and Remedies, 2 FIN. ASSETS & INVESTING 47, 56–58 (2017); Martin Cihak &
Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Rethinking the State’s Role in Finance 3–4 (World Bank
Policy Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6400, 2013).
248 Hopt, supra note 226, at 349–50.
249 Id.
250 See id.; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Watcher, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 722–23 (2010); Mulbert,
supra note 227, at 16–17.
251 Hopt, supra note 226, at 350.
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monitor the management of banks.252 The ceiling amount of insurance under deposit insurance further poses obstacles to introducing large-sum concentrated creditors in banks.253 These all
weaken the creditor governance of banks, which, in turn, encourages managements to increase risk-taking in banks to honor
shareholders’ interests.
Given the inherent defects of shareholders and creditors,
the best practice of bank governance entrusts the mission to the
board of directors. The Basel Committee issued eight principles for
bank governance in 1999 and updated them in 2006.254 These principles highlighted the role of the board of directors in bank governance.255 Such emphases also obtained some recognition in the
United States. Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O’Hara, for instance, suggested that bank directors should “take solvency risk
explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions.”256 They further argued that the bank directors should owe
duties and obligations to creditors as well, instead of exclusively
to shareholders.257 These all highlight the central role of the board
of directors in bank governance.
C. Dilemma of Bank Governance After the Financial Crisis
The Financial Crisis ruthlessly exposed the deficiency of
the current practices of bank governance as well as many other
problems of banking regulation and supervision. 258 While some
Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 98; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 18.
Mulbert, supra note 227, at 18.
254 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 6–18 (2006) [hereinafter ENHANCING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. This was the first institution to codify corporate governance principles on minimum requirements for bank governance before the
Crisis. See also Hopt, supra note 226, at 356.
255 ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 254, at 6–18.
256 Macey & O’Hara, supra note 227, at 92.
257 Id.
258 Mulbert, supra note 227, at 7–8 (enumerating the discussions that deal
with the causes of the financial crisis, such as the United States President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets, the Financial Stability Board, the IMF,
the Institute of International Finance, the G-20 Study Group, the Declaration
of the Washington Summit of the G-20 proposing the “Action Plan to Implement
252
253
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commentators argued that failures of bank governance had little
or even no relevance to the outbreak of the Financial Crisis,259
the majority opinion, both on international levels (such as in the
OECD260 and the Basel Committee261), and on regional levels (such
as in the United States, 262 European Union263 and the United
Kingdom264), maintained that failures of bank governance accelerated and aggravated the Financial Crisis.265
Principles for Reform,” etc.). See generally THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN
THE U.S.].
259 See Renee Adams, Governance and the Financial Crisis, 12 INT’L REV. FIN.
7, 34 (2012); Peter J. Wallison & Arthur F. Burns, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Dissenting Statement, in 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE
U.S., supra note 258.
260 See 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 12; OECD, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL CRISIS: CONCLUSIONS AND EMERGING GOOD
PRACTICES TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 13 (Feb. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter 2010 OECD CONCLUSIONS].
261 The Basel Committee proposed its new reports in 2010 and 2015 to expand
principles for bank governance. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010) [hereinafter BASEL 2010 PRINCIPLES]; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS (2015) [hereinafter BASEL
2015 PRINCIPLES].
262 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at
xviii–xix.
263 The European Commission in 2010 put forward the Green Paper on
numerous issues of financial institution governance. See generally European
Commission, Green Paper: Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and
Remuneration Policies, COM (2010) 284 final (Feb. 6, 2010), accompanied by
European Commission, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: Lessons to be Drawn from the Current Financial Crisis, Best practices, SEC (2010)
669 (Feb. 6, 2010).
264 The Walker Review in 2009 went through the bank governance issues
in the United Kingdom. See generally DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES—FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS (Nov. 26, 2009).
265 OECD, for instance, identified four areas of corporate governance failures,
i.e., (1) remuneration, (2) risk management, (3) board practices, and (4) exercise of
shareholder rights. See 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 7–11;
Mulbert, supra note 227, at 19, 28–30. See generally Hopt, supra note 226; Grant
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1. Risk Management and Control
The failure of banks to manage their risks is a major problem revealed by the Financial Crisis.266 A number of banks either
failed to identify the risks or sought to explain them away to
justify the risks.267 Due to their multilevel organizational structures, many banks even failed to pass their risks to the ultimate
decision level for consideration.268 A notorious example is that many
banks engaged in the subprime mortgage market and derivatives
such as collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) without fully comprehending the incurred risks and how these risks would influence their own financial status.269 This is a major reason why
the Financial Crisis expanded in such a fast and broad manner.
The counter-argument claims that the above observations
are simply hindsight narratives. It argues that virtually all participants in the financial system failed to foresee the crisis; therefore, we should not blame banks for their failure to manage these
unexpected risks.270 Nevertheless, the spirit of risk management
lies not only in foreseeing the unexpected risks, but also in being
well-prepared to reduce losses to the minimum once any unexpected risks occur. Before the Financial Crisis, most banks apparently ignored the importance of equipping themselves to sustain
unexpected risks. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission specified, before the Financial Crisis, the five major investment banks—
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
and Morgan Stanley—were operating with extraordinarily thin
capital, which was less than 2.5 percent of the leverage ratio.271
This means that a 2.5 percent drop in asset value could make them
Kirkpatrick, Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 2009 FIN.
MKT. TRENDS 1 (2009).
266 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31; 2010 OECD
CONCLUSIONS, supra note 260, at 13; 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at xviii–xix; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 28.
267 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31; 2011 REPORT ON THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at xviii–xix; Kirkpatrick, supra
note 265, at 66.
268 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31.
269 Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 65; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 28.
270 Wallison & Burns, supra note 259, at 446.
271 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at
xix–xx.
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insolvent.272 The Commission also pointed out that they relied
too much on “short-term [borrowing] in the overnight market.”273
This shows that they were just too ignorant of the importance of
risk management.
2. Board Capacity and Practices
Following the lack of adequate risk management, another
problem relates to the capacity of banks’ decision-makers to act as
gatekeepers. Preventing banks from taking excessive risks requires
not only a system of risk management but also having the right persons there. Good bank governance shall emphasize “expertise” more
than “independence,” or at least place them on an equal footing.274
Many directors and senior managers of banks, however, did not
possess sufficient expertise, experience, and knowledge to conduct
proper risk management.275 Another key lesson from the Financial Crisis is that, in practice, bank directors tend to take false
comfort from their regulatory capital ratios—they failed to inquire
further into the risk profile of the banks once they found compliance with regulatory requirements.276
3. Compensation Regime
Compensation regimes are another aspect of corporate governance that attracted focus during the Financial Crisis. Many
commentators believed that equity-based pay caused directors and
Id. at xix.
Id.
274 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 44–46; 2010 OECD
CONCLUSIONS, supra note 260, at 19–21; Hopt, supra note 226, at 362; Kirkpatrick,
supra note 265, at 81–82; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 29–30. Some commentators
even point the fingers at the widespread imposition of independent director requirements in financial sectors, which caused directors on the boards of financial institutions to have limited professions and experience. See Adams, supra note
259, at 34; Renee B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
243, 249 (2012); Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 81–82.
275 Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 62.
276 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31; Brian R. Cheffins,
The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial Crisis, 16
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 40 (2015); Mulbert, supra note 227, at 37.
272
273
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managers to place greater emphasis on shareholders’ interests, resulting in greater risk-taking by banks and leading to the Financial
Crisis.277 Specifically, the compensation design before the Financial
Crisis aligned the interests of directors and management of banks
too much with the firms’ short-term stock performance. This created
incentives for directors and management to undertake myopic
and risky activities to boost short-term stock performance at the
risk of the stability and survival of banks.278 Without reshaping
such compensation regimes, banks can hardly have people on the
board with the right incentive to conduct proper risk management
even though they are capable of doing so.279
4. Reform and Dilemma: How to Create a Robust Board of
Directors?
a. Better Regulation Is Needed, but Not Enough
After the Financial Crisis, reformers proposed a number of
ways to enhance the risk control of banks. One straightforward
way is to promulgate a complete set of banking regulations to impose stricter requirements on banks. For instance, the Basel Committee adopted the Basel III standards in 2010, which significantly
raised the capital requirement, added the leverage ratio requirement, and adopted measures of liquidity risks.280
While enhanced banking regulation and supervision is definitely needed and helpful for preventing another crisis, they are not
capable of resolving all the associated concerns. This is because
they merely set a minimum requirement for banks to observe but
satisfying these requirements does not guarantee that banks will be
free from any risks.
See, e.g., 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 14–30, 40; 2011
REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at xix; Bruner,
supra note 186, at 316–17; Hopt, supra note 226, at 367; Kirkpatrick, supra
note 265, at 72–73.
278 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at xix.
279 For related proposals to reform bankers’ pay, see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010).
280 See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS (2010) [hereinafter BASEL III]. For a summary of key changes under
Basel III, see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 607–31.
277
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For one thing, banking regulations are doomed to be incomplete. The financial world is so complicated and ever-changing, and
the innovation of financial products and financial techniques are
so rapid. Banking regulations can hardly catch up with them immediately. Even though the regulator can amend banking regulations from time to time after it finds the deficiency of the current
laws, the amendment itself needs time, which inevitably leaves
a significant window period. The evolution of Basel capital requirements provides a vivid example. Before the Financial Crisis, Basel II had largely revised Basel I, introducing a far more
detailed set of capital requirements to address credit risks of
banks.281 Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis made us realize that
Basel II was just not enough. Basel II simply ignored the liquidity
risk, which was a major cause of the Financial Crisis.282 Therefore,
Basel III adopted the liquidity coverage requirements and net
stable funding ratios to resolve this deficiency. 283 This experience taught us a lesson: we can hardly be sure that the current
banking regulations and standards have exhausted all possible
categories of risks.
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to come up with one-sizefits-all banking regulations. Each bank has its own risk profile.
For instance, the regulator can certainly promulgate a rule prohibiting any banks from extending loans to a single borrower
above a specified numerical limit. Nevertheless, it does not guarantee that banks would not suffer serious harms as long as it
observes this limit. Banks still need to consider, in each specific
case, the identity, financial conditions, and credit record of this
borrower, the quality of its collateral, the bank’s own financial
conditions, and loans profile, and so on. There are too many factors to consider on a case-by-case basis. No benevolent regulator
can possibly enact regulations to prescribe for all these details.
Even if it is possible, the regulatory cost would be unimaginably
enormous, which makes it impracticable.
To be sure, I do not intend to argue that improving banking regulation and supervision is futile. They are always the
BASEL II COMMITTEE ON BANK SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK
COMPREHENSIVE VERSION i–ii, ¶ 11 (2004) [hereinafter BASEL II].
281

282
283

BASEL III, supra note 280, ¶¶ 34–36.
Id. ¶¶ 40–42.
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main tool to control misbehaviors and associated risks of banks.
The point is that banking regulations and supervisions have their
own limits. As mentioned above, one key lesson from the Financial Crisis was that bank directors took too much comfort from their
compliance with regulatory requirements without inquiring further
into the risk profile of the banks.284 In light of that, improving
bank governance is still warranted. In a sense, bank governance
and banking regulation are complementary with each other in
functional terms.285
b. Better Governance Is Needed but How Can It Be
Achieved?
Reforms resulting from the failure of bank governance during the Financial Crisis stress the importance of a robust risk
management system. 286 Nevertheless, a well-functioning bank
governance system depends on the quality of people.287 Rules and
principles of best practices are all in the book, but it is the people
who give them life. The problem thus rests not only on how to conduct risk management but also on whom to entrust to conduct it.
Related reforms again stress the important role of the
board of directors.288 OECD made it clear that “oversight of risk
2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31; Mulbert, supra note
227, at 37.
285 Mulbert, supra note 227, at 25–26; see also Renee Adams & Hamid Mehran,
Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies, 9 ECON. POL’Y
REV. 123, 123 (2003); Cheffins, supra note 276, at 2, 11, 37; Heremans & Bosquet,
supra note 247, at 1568; Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks:
A Financial Stability Perspective 8–9 (Center for Econ. Stud., Discussion Paper
Series No. 07.07, Feb. 2007).
286 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31.
287 Hopt, supra note 226, at 368.
288 As a side note, the reform of general corporate governance, as opposed to
bank governance, appears to focus on enhancing shareholder empowerment. For
instance, the Dodd-Frank Act passed several legal designs to enhance the shareholders’ say on corporate decisions, such as non-binding shareholder vote to
approve executive compensation (“say on pay”), enhanced disclosure regarding
the executive compensation and financial performance of the issuer, three-year
clawback of incentive-based pay following accounting restatements, the SEC’s
authority to expand proxy access, etc. Bruner, supra note 186, at 320. While
shareholder empowerment undeniably has some merits in better preventing
managers from failing to pursue shareholders’ interests, it can hardly resolve the
284
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management is a clear duty of the board” and “it is considered good
practice that the Board is responsible for both establishing and
overseeing the company’s enterprise-wide, risk management system
and ensuring that it is compatible with its strategy and risk appetite.”289 “Particularly in financial institutions, a separate channel of
risk reporting to the board such as via a chief risk officer is warranted in the same way as internal audit reports separately to the
audit committee and not just to the CEO.”290 In its revised principles for corporate governance of banks, the Basel Committee also
reiterated that “the board has overall responsibility for the bank,
including approving and overseeing the implementation of the
bank’s strategic objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and
corporate values.”291 Grant Kirkpatrick made it clear that “qualified
board oversight and robust risk management is important.”292 Klaus
J. Hopt also held a similar position, stating that “the problem is
rather enforcement” and stressed the importance of strengthening supervisory requirements such as establishing a separate risk
committee and independent Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”) as well as
having qualified and experienced board members; “[i]n the end,
everything depends on the people.”293
The board of directors ought to be the central focus, but its
poor performance during the Financial Crisis, as mentioned above,
exposed its inherent deficiency.294 As revealed in the Financial
real problem, i.e., the protection of creditors’ interests as well as other public
interests. According to Bruner, the reason for such movement could be because
“our corporate governance system largely revolves around two powerful constituencies, the board and the shareholders. Thus, to the degree the crisis was
caused by board oversight failures, the answer must be more shareholder[s’]
monitoring of boards themselves.” Id. at 321. This simple dichotomy, however,
does not really scratch where it itches. See id.
289 2010 OECD CONCLUSIONS, supra note 260, at 14–15 (emphasis added).
290 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 40 (emphasis added).
OECD also made it clear that “[t]he board bears primary responsibility for
strategy and for associated risk management.” Id. “Boards must therefore
monitor the structure of the company and its culture and also ensure a reliable and relevant flow of information (the assurance perspective) to the board
about the implementation of its strategy and the associated risks.” Id.
291 BASEL 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 261, at 7 (emphasis added); BASEL
2015 PRINCIPLES, supra note 261, at 8 (emphasis added).
292 Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 62 (emphasis added).
293 Hopt, supra note 226, at 367–68 (emphasis added).
294 Id. at 349.
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Crisis, business directors may lack adequate expertise and experience to comprehend the risk profile of the bank and conduct
meaningful risk management accordingly.295 Even if they have
the knowledge and capacity, they may have insufficient incentive
to pay attention to such risks.296 This is because their profit-seeking
mindset, together with the profit-based compensation scheme, may
induce them to undertake and justify risks rather than control
risks.297 In the end, banks’ boards of directors might lack necessary capacity and incentive to duly conduct risk management.298
The board of directors remains the key to robust bank
governance and risk management in a post–Financial Crisis era.
The central problem now is how to find the right people with the
right incentive, expertise, and experience to sit on the board.
D. Can Government Directors Supplement Business Directors?
To have the right people sit on the board, the core question
is: which entity is best suited to select the right people? I propose
that, when the private ordering fails, the government may well be
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 349.
297 Id.
298 One intuitive proposal to address this dilemma is to strengthen board
independence, such as increasing the portion of independent directors on the board
of banks. This might not scratch where it itches. The independence requirement,
since its adoption, has been subject to long-time criticism. On the one hand,
systemic evidence demonstrating that independent directors will enhance firm
performance in the United States appears absent. On the other hand, it could
restrict the room for banks to retain experienced talent as board directors because
in banking sectors these suitable persons would be mostly affiliated ones. Besides,
independence of the board merely ensures that board members may be less captured by management, but independence itself has nothing to do with enhanced
capacity and incentive of board members to perform risk management for banks.
Therefore, simply following the old path to ask for more independence of the
board does not appear to be a convincing solution. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra
note 2, at 178–83; Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 81–82; Hopt, supra note 226,
at 362. For studies finding no positive correlation between board independence
and firm performance, see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Noncorrelation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J.
CORP. L. 231, 233–34 (2001); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate
Governance and Firm Operating Performance, 32 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. &
ACCT. 129, 130–31 (2009).
295
296
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that entity.299 Government ownership of banks facilitates the government’s appointment of government directors to banks’ boards
and thus the government’s new role.300
1. Better Protection of Creditors
To begin with, government owners and their appointed government directors may better represent creditors’ interests on
the boards of banks than shareholder-elected directors. As mentioned above, corporate creditors are as crucial as shareholders
in capitalizing banks.301 Government directors can better represent creditors’ interests on the board because the regulator’s interests are closely aligned with those of creditors.302 They both prefer
a less risky bank: creditors prefer their debts repaid and the regulators prefer a stable financial system.303 Deposit insurance also
renders the regulator the ultimate creditor of insured banks and
further aligns the government’s interest with creditors. 304 Accordingly, the government is better motivated to implement risk
management systems within banks and thus protect creditors’
interest. This common objective of creditors and the regulator is
exactly what is missing in the current board practice. Government
directors can supplement this missing piece by bringing more robust risk management and balancing banks’ profits against risk
control. As a consequence of enhanced creditor protection, government directors also stabilize individual banks, as well as the
entire financial system.305
To be sure, I do not intend to assert that shareholders’ interests should be subordinated to creditors’ interests. The primary
objective of banks remains to maximize firms’ value. The role of
government directors on the board is simply to ensure that banks
do not pursue profits at the expense of creditors.
For the literature favoring this idea, see Black, supra note 12, at 594–
95; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 20. For the literature disfavoring this idea, see
Hopt, supra note 226, at 353–54.
300 Black, supra note 12, at 594–95.
301 Mulbert, supra note 227, at 10.
302 Id. at 25–26.
303 Bruner, supra note 186, at 312.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 317.
299
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2. Supplement Incomplete Banking Regulation and Supervision
In addition, government directors can be a useful tool for
the banking regulator to implement regulatory policies within
banks. Banking regulations are inevitably incomplete due to the
complexity and ever-changing nature of the financial world. While
amending or supplementing problematic banking regulations is
feasible, in reality, it is always one pace behind the pace of rapid
financial innovation.306 In addition, each bank has its own risk profile, and banking regulations can only impose minimal requirements, not optimal requirements. Therefore, simply vesting the
regulators with rulemaking and supervision authority might not
be able to address all problems in advance and in time. Banking
regulation and supervision just have their limits.
To address such limits, the regulator can perhaps promulgate a general rule in advance with abstract standards while
authorizing the regulator to implement it through its discretion
on a case-by-case basis. Basel II partly adopted this approach: its
internal-ratings-based approach applicable to sophisticated banks
does not stipulate specific numerical capital requirements. 307 Instead, it merely specifies several factors for each bank’s consideration.308 Banks may conduct their own internal estimates of
risk components to determine their own capital requirements.309
To prevent sophisticated banks from abusing their discretion, this
approach also vests the banking regulator with wide supervisory
power, which largely relies on the regulator to supervise the reasonableness and appropriateness of each bank’s own model.310 In this
way, it is the banking regulator’s ex post supervision of each individual bank that guards the safety and soundness of banks, rather than the ex ante banking regulation.311 Undeniably, this ex
post regulatory approach may be more feasible than promulgating complete banking regulations. Nevertheless, this approach
See BASEL II, supra note 281, ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 211.
308 Id. ¶ 219.
309 Id. ¶ 211. For an example of the internal-ratings-based approach under
Basel II, see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 599–601.
310 BASEL II, supra note 281, ¶ 216.
311 Id.
306
307
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involves intensive governmental supervision and inevitably contains considerable regulatory costs.312
In contrast to regulators, government directors can be more
efficient. Government directors can monitor and reflect the regulator’s concerns on a case-by-case basis, which may supplement the
banking regulation and supervision. Specifically, government directors could implement regulatory policies based on the risk profile
of each bank without promulgating a complete set of banking regulations to address all the details. This saves the regulatory cost.
Another benefit is that government directors do not need to be
restricted to government officials. The regulator may retain other
private professionals in law, accounting, or finance, such as professors, lawyers, accountants, bankers, or retired managers, to serve
as government directors. This reduces the staffing problem. Moreover, as these representatives are directors of banks, their fees
would be paid by banks instead of the government budget, which
saves the government budget as well. In this sense, government
directors may be another option that supplements the incomplete banking regulation and supervision.
3. The Regulator’s Better Access to Information
An additional benefit of employing government directors
is that they can facilitate the regulator’s information gathering.
The opaqueness of banks creates informational asymmetries that
plague the regulator’s regulation and supervision.313 By having
government directors on the board, the regulator can obtain more
internal information not easily accessible to outside regulators.
This facilitates banking regulation and supervision in several
ways. First, government directors may serve as an early warning
system, allowing the regulator to receive information about the
status of specific banks more immediately and accurately. Second,
For instance, to gather adequate information to monitor banks and to
timely address different individual cases, the regulator needs to send a large
number of government officials to station at each bank. A large number of government employees would be needed to supervise all the internal-ratings-based
approaches of the national banks, especially to supervise each bank’s many transactions, such as lending decisions, equity issuance, derivatives, or investment
in securitization, etc.
313 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 591, 599 (2013).
312
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government directors may also reduce the information cost between the regulator and the regulated firms; the regulator can
thus obtain more knowledge and know-how in banking industries for designing banking regulations that are more suitable to
sectoral needs. Finally, these government directors can accumulate considerable knowledge, experience, and expertise related to
banking sectors, and may become more reliable talents for the
regulator in the future. Some directors may even become candidates for the chief of regulatory agencies.
To be sure, the regulator can also obtain access to internal
information of banks by requiring them to provide information
periodically to the regulator. In fact, the U.S. regulator already has
such power.314 The regulator can even promulgate a rule which
requires all banks to provide all board meeting materials to the
regulator so that the regulator can obtain information equally with
a board member of banks without sitting on the board. Nevertheless, there remain some differences between this regulatory
approach vis-à-vis a directorship approach. For one thing, government directors cannot only access the information but also
influence banks’ decisions. Accordingly, the regulator’s authority
to request information from banks cannot fully replace government
directorship of banks. Moreover, as a regulator, the government
seeks information for the regulatory purpose. Therefore, the government’s request of information needs a regulatory justification.
Outside this scope, the government, as a regulator, is less justified to ask for information. In contrast, as a board member, the
government may have more justified access to corporate information, which extends to all business-related information, because
a director does not need to restrict his/her concern to regulatory
matters. Therefore, government directors can request more information for consideration. This is of merit particularly when
the banking regulation is incomplete so that the regulator has
less legal ground to ask for information.315
BASEL II, supra note 281, ¶ 536.
For instance, when the amount of a financial institution’s loan to a single
entity does not exceed the statutorily prohibited amount, the government, as a
regulator, should have little grounds to make further inquiries. The government, as a board member, however, will undoubtedly be justified in inquiring
further into the details in order to conduct risk assessment and risk management
for precautionary purposes.
314
315
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E. Summary
To conclude, I argue that government ownership of banks,
accompanied with the use of government directors, can facilitate
a robust bank governance system. A major concern against this
argument could be that government directors may implicate dramatic political influences and shift the government’s focus from
regulatory concern to political self-interest.316 In most jurisdictions,
this concern could be true. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Part III of
this Article, comparatively speaking, the United States can be optimistic thanks to its more competitive financial market, more advanced financial system, and more well-developed political and
legal institutions.
My argument finds support from the study of Svetlana
Andrianova et al.317 Based on similar samples as those employed
by La Porta et al., they found that, after controlling two additional institutional factors, i.e., index measuring bureaucratic
quality and its insulation from political intervention and index
of property rights, government ownership of banks was in fact
positively associated with long-run economic growth. 318 Their
explanation of this result is that government ownership of banks
may alleviate the “extreme, yet real, threat to the growth promoting role of banks” posed by the extreme yet unchecked moral
hazard behavior of opportunistic bank insiders. 319 Based on
these findings, Andrianova et al. believe that “even in the 21st
century, government owned banks can continue to play a ‘developmental’ role, not only in developing but also in industrialized
countries by constraining extreme moral hazard behaviors that
have a capacity to undermine long term economic growth.” 320
This finding supports my argument that government ownership
and directorship of banks could enhance bank governance and
risk management.
Hopt, supra note 226, at 354.
See generally Svetlana Andrianova et al., Is Government Ownership of
Banks Really Harmful to Growth? 1 (Brunel Univ. Econ. & Fin. Dep’t, Working
Paper No. 09-20, 2009).
318 Id. at 1.
319 Id. at 10.
320 Id.
316
317
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IV. A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The United States Should Be More Positive
To be sure, I do not propose a general application of government ownership or directorship to all banks. It could be too costly
for the U.S. government to purchase shares of all banks. Besides,
even though it is technically feasible to promulgate statutes or regulations authorizing the regulator to appoint government directors
on the board of all banks, this approach would prove impossible
for political reasons. Furthermore, the regulator would find it
difficult to recruit an adequate number of government directors
for all banks. Therefore, a general application of this reform to
all banks is not a feasible option.
I do, however, believe that the U.S. banking sector should
hold a more positive view toward government ownership of banks.
As I argued, the United States has the position to be more optimistic of government ownership than other countries. This positive attitude may allow the U.S. government to be less hesitant
when it needs to hold ownership of banks for policy reasons, such
as bailouts.
A step further, government ownership and directorship
should at least remain an option for complementing banking regulation and supervision. The U.S. banking regulator could consider
a regime, under which it appoints a small number of government
directors to sit on the board of a specific bank when that bank
fails to perform its risk management appropriately. For instance,
where a bank significantly or repetitively fails the stress test, falls
below a specific capital requirement threshold, fails the liquidity
requirement, encounters serious internal control deficiencies,
breaches laws, etc., these instances could be understood as signals
demonstrating the unqualified corporate governance and risk
management of that bank. In these cases, the government may
not want to hesitate to step in anymore; otherwise, risks could be
further exposed and expanded. Specifically, when a bank goes
insolvent and requires the equity bailout from the government,
it suggests the risk management failure of this bank, which
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should justify the government’s ownership and directorship of
that bank.321
This alternative approach harmonizes with the prevalent
resistance to government ownership and directorship. It leaves
the task of corporate governance and risk management to the
private sector in the first place. As long as the private sector can
perform well on its own initiative, the regulator need not insist
on intervening. If, however, there is a sign that business directors are unable to prevent excessive risk-taking, they may have
less legitimate excuses to refuse the government’s intervention.
In such cases, government ownership and directorship may find
more justification and thus absorb more resistance. Besides, such
government ownership and directorship of banks need not be on
a permanent basis. The regulator can set a specific period for the
mandatory government representation and, on expiration, reassess whether it is necessary to extend this period.322
B. Some Practical Considerations
Plenty of literature has discussed how to design a regulatory structure for future bailouts, in particular in respect of how
to institutionalize government bailouts323 and how to address the
potential conflict of interest.324 In addition to these proposals, I
See Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 329 (2012).
322 It also harmonizes with the arguments that government ownership, if
needed, should be at most temporary. Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is
the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1362–63; Hopt, supra note 226, at
354 (arguing that permanent representation would allow too much political
interference into the decision-making of banks).
323 For instance, Manns proposed an insightful set of bailout rules which
centers on the incorporation of a “Federal Government Investment Corporation” to handle future bailouts based on a long-term investment approach. See
generally Manns, supra note 8. His proposal, however, tends to focus on the
protection of taxpayers and prevention of moral hazard, which is different
from the focus of this Article on risk management of banks. To some extent,
the issues addressed below complement Manns’ proposals. See Verret, The Bailout
Through a Public Choice Lens, supra note 7, at 1566–78 (advocating the use
of a trust structure resembling that in the AIG case for unavoidable bailouts).
324 See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Fiduciary-Based Standards for Bailout Contractors: What the Treasury Got Right and Wrong in TARP, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1614, 1623 (2011); Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest
321
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add some more practical considerations in case the U.S. government
needs to hold ownership or directorship of banks in the future.
1. Source of Talents
The first question relates to “whom” the government should
appoint to the board of banks. Black and Jordan, representing the
minority opinion supporting government ownership, proposed that
the government should appoint its public officials to serve as government directors.325 A concern related to this proposal is a problem of quality. The U.S. government officials may lack sufficient
experience in business sectors due to the government’s long selfconstraint from involving itself in corporate operations.326 They
may not have adequate capacity to make sound business decisions for banks.327
A more desirable approach is to reach out to professionals
outside the governmental system. The government could establish a database of “professional directors,”328 including, in addition
to governmental officials, professionals in law, finance, or accounting, such as professors, researchers, lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, former bank officers, and so on. The idea is to
retain the “professionals” with either the street smarts or school
smarts, who comprehend the necessary expertise or possess experience in the banking sector and can appreciate the importance of
risk management in banks.
and Ethics when Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 155–
59 (2009).
325 Black, supra note 12, at 594; Jordan, supra note 165, at 17–18.
326 See Jon D. Michaels, Book Review, Running Government Like a Business ... Then and Now, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1152, 1164 (2015).
327 Id.
328 The idea of “professional directors” was firstly proposed by Ronald J.
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, but they introduce this concept in a different
context. What they contemplate is having institutional investors establish an
organized clearinghouse, or other intermediaries, which set up a database of
professionals to be nominated to the boards of companies. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 881 (1991). In contrast, what I propose
here is that the government would be the “intermediary” that establishes such a
database and appoints proper talents to be board members of banks.
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After the appointment, the regulator and these representatives should regularly communicate with each other on regulatory
policy concerns and exchange necessary information. The stationed
bank should pay these government directors from its own pocket
in accordance with its compensation standard. There might be a
concern that the stationed bank would thus capture these government directors. With the government’s supervision, particularly
its appointment and dismissal power, however, such capture should
be less of a problem.
2. Minority Ownership and Directorship Structure
To reduce the negative effects of government ownership of
banks, the government should take as minority of a position on
the board of banks as possible (except in extreme cases, e.g., where
there is a strong need to inject large capital into a specific financial institution, such as that in the AIG case).329 This minority
model aims to build in a mechanism which represents creditors’
interests and risk management so as to facilitate the board to
make a safer and sounder judgment. Since the government does not
take majority control of the board, it cannot unilaterally dominate
management appointment or corporate decisions. Rather, its role
is to echo the risk concern and supervise the majority members
in order to pull back business directors from over-pursuing shortterm profits without regard to the risks undertaken by banks.
The final word is still subject to the collective decision of the
board, not dominated by government minority directors. By acting as a supervisor rather than a controller, this model can subtly mitigate the negative concerns associated with government
ownership and directorship.
Undeniably, the fact that the regulator backs these directors may trigger some regulatory and political implications. This
inevitably makes their “minority” voice louder in the boardroom.
Therefore, laws should restrict actions of government directors
Manns also holds a similar position by proposing that government investments should be limited to 50 percent of the equity value of any recipient in
order to avoid excessive entanglement of the government in the private sector.
Manns, supra note 8, at 1386–87. Cf. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice
Lens, supra note 7, at 1566–78 (proposing to use the trust structure to prevent
political intervention).
329
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to those related to risk management of banks. I will discuss this
in the following Section.
3. Role and Duty of Government Directors
In terms of the role of government directors, I propose that
they should be actively involved in the risk management of banks.
The goal of government directors is to improve risk management
to protect creditors’ interests, the stability of the individual bank,
and the whole financial system. Accordingly, unlike the APC practices, where the government adopted a hands-off approach and
took intervention only in transactions not in the normal course
of business,330 government directors here should be more active
in the corporate affairs bearing on risk management of banks.331
The fiduciary duty of these government directors should
be generally similar to ordinary business directors. Even though
government directors would focus more on the stability and survival of banks and less on shareholders, this is not inconsistent
with the prevalent shareholder primacy view—that shareholders’
interest should be the primary concern of directors.332 Shareholders
remain the residual claimants of banks; thus, when government
directors pursue the stability and survival of banks without diverting firm value for other purposes, they also benefit shareholders. Undeniably, sometimes shareholders favor short-term
interests at the cost of stability and survival of banks, such as
some excessively risky investments.333 In such cases, however,
Kole & Mulherin, supra note 74, at 9.
Manns further proposed that the government should make corporate
governance and systemic risk reform a condition of bailouts up front. Manns,
supra note 8, at 1391–92.
332 For the content and rationale of shareholder primacy, see, e.g., FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 35–39 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 576–79
(2014); American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2268–70 (1990);
John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 28 (Reinier Kraakman et
al. eds., 3d ed., 2017); Ryan J. York, Visages of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other
Constituency Anti-takeover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient Market
for Corporate Control, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 197–98 (2002).
333 York, supra note 332, at 203.
330
331
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several Delaware court decisions have suggested that directors
may take into account the interest of the corporation itself to the
extent that the corporation’s interest differs from that of shareholders’.334 Accordingly, as long as government directors pursue
the stability and survival of banks, even though their risk-adverse
attitude could reduce shareholders’ immediate profit (such as the
risk premium associated with such risk-taking behaviors), the
business judgment rule protects their decision.335
On the other hand, what government directors should not
pursue are those social objectives unrelated to the stability of banks
and the financial system. The mission of government directors
should be as simple as possible. Involving other social objectives
could incur too much complexity and therefore leave leeway for
politicians to exercise their political influence.336 Vivid examples
having bearing here are the government corporations of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac as mentioned above. The government exercised its leverage in these GSEs to pursue its housing policy,
which was arguably a socially beneficial policy yet unrelated to
See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director’s Dilemma, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 287, 297 (1996) (arguing that Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co. and Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. “support the discretion
of directors under the business judgment rule to make the best decision for the
corporation, even if the shareholders would have preferred other action”); Robert
A. McCormick, Union Representatives as Corporate Directors: The Challenge to
the Adversarial Model of Labor Relations, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 247 n.132
(1982) (arguing that “a majority of courts will not void a board decision that is
fair and reasonable to the corporation, merely because a director with an outside
interest participated in making the decision” and citing Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 306 (1939), Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d
66 (Cal. App. 1952), and Fill Bldgs. Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co.,
241 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. 1976), as examples.); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T.
Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions
Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 765 (2008).
335 McCormick, supra note 334, at 247.
336 Nicholas O. Kennedy, for instance, advocated an expansive view of corporate purpose, which makes fiduciary duties imposed on the government controlling shareholder unnecessary. See Nicholas O. Kennedy, Citizens or Shareholders?:
Analyzing the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duties as a Controlling Shareholder in Corporations Receiving Funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program,
12 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 21, 56 (2011). Under this view, however, there is a real
concern that the United States would lose an important tool for controlling
government shareholder’s and directors’ behaviors.
334
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their financial stability.337 It turned out that the whole financial
system paid for the government’s intervention for such unrelated
purposes. 338 Accordingly, the mission of government directors
should be simply balancing creditors’ interests and the stability
and survival of their stationed banks with shareholders’ interests,
without regard to other social objectives.339
4. Access to Fiduciary Claims Against Government Directors
Aside from the substance of the fiduciary duty of government
directors as discussed above, there could be a procedural concern
about whether government directors bear fiduciary duties. This
issue arises from the sovereign immunity doctrine.340
The sovereign immunity doctrine provides that the sovereign
(i.e., the federal government) cannot be sued unless it allows itself
to be.341 Under this doctrine, procedurally, plaintiffs can bring a
claim against the federal government only in federal court.342
Substantively, they cannot bring such claims unless the claims fall
within the waivers of sovereign immunity, i.e., the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the Tucker Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act.343
Where an officer’s or agent’s conduct incurs personal liability,
relief against that person would normally be considered as relief
Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1305–06.
338 Id.
339 On the other hand, I do not suggest that all banks cannot voluntarily
engage in activities of social welfare. My proposal simply wishes to set a limit
to government directors’ actions in order to mitigate the concerns of political
influence. It is another story if it is the business directors, rather than the government directors, who initiate such social activities. Plenty of literature has
argued that with or without regard to the interest of a corporation, a corporation is entitled to engage in public welfare activities. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profit in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763
(2005); Rhee, supra note 196, at 662.
340 For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of government directors, other directors as well as the government controlling shareholders, see generally Barnes,
supra note 125, at 1445–66; Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra
note 12, at 418–26; Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 333–40.
341 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1982).
342 Id.
343 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1325–46; Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 307–13.
337
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against the sovereign if the decree would “operate against the [sovereign].”344 This, in turn, forbids a court from taking jurisdiction
in a suit against him or her.345 Although related court rulings did
not consistently reconcile with each other,346 in practice, if a judgment would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment
would restrain the government from acting or compel it to act, it
could be considered as a judgment against the sovereign.347
Applying these sets of rules to a fiduciary claim against
government directors, who could be considered the government’s
agents, it is possible that courts would treat these claims as against
the government. After all, such a claim has the potential to interfere
with the public administration or restrain the government’s action.
In that case, it is arguable as to whether any waivers under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the Tucker Act, or the Administrative
Procedure Act can apply to the fiduciary claims here. 348 Even
though state courts find such claims are not precluded by the sovereign immunity doctrine, they, particularly Delaware courts, would
tend to refrain from judging on this issue in order to prevent a
confrontation with the federal government so as to preserve the
state right to regulate corporate matters.349 According to Marcel
Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 314 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
345 Id.; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984).
346 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 698 (1949).
347 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).
348 In respect of the Federal Tort Claims Act, it is arguable as to whether a
breach of fiduciary duty is a tort. In respect of the Administrative Procedure
Act, it is also arguable as to whether the actions of government shareholders
or directors are an exercise of agency authority. The Tucker Act could be a
possible chance for fiduciary claimants. However, since court precedent suggests a precondition to the Tucker Act that the government has established
comprehensive federal control over those banks and thus taken on the fiduciary duties, it is arguable as well, though no case law has opined on this issue.
See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
supra note 12, at 1326–45.
349 Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 426–30. They
reference the Delaware court’s stay of In re Bear Stearns Cos. Shareholder
Litigation case in favor of the New York court’s decision during the Financial
Crisis, and infer that Delaware courts will tend to duck when the case implicates a confrontation with the federal government. For their detailed reasons,
see also Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder,
344
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Kahan and Edward Rock, a potential vehicle for the Delaware
courts to achieve this purpose may be Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19, which provides substantial flexibility for the court
to dismiss the case on grounds that a necessary joinder for trying
the fiduciary claim against government directors, i.e., the government, is absent.350 In that case, government-owned banks can
never claim the accountability of government directors.
To ensure the accountability of government directors, Congress needs to explicitly clarify the access to fiduciary claims against
government directors. Government directors need to be accountable and undertake their fiduciary duties. To the extent that such
liability could be precluded, I propose that Congress should consider clarifying it explicitly in the statutes by creating an enabling
legislation to waive the government’s sovereign immunity with regard to its involvement in corporate affairs of banks. This proposal
is not unprecedented: Congress created such enabling legislation
when establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to bail
out the savings and loan industry.351 Enhancing the accountability
of government directors can also effectively mitigate political influence because government directors, fearing personal liabilities,
would have less incentive to succumb to politicians’ requests.
Reducing these political risks may further assist banks to raise
private capital and increase the value of firms’ stock.352
supra note 12, at 1324–25; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard
Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use
of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 713–17 (2009).
350 See Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 431–35.
351 When establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to bail out
the savings and loan industry, Congress created such enabling legislation, which
provided that the RTC may “sue and be sued in its corporate capacity in any
court of competent jurisdiction.” 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(9)(E) (2006). A similar
precedent also exists for the RFC during the Great Depression, where Congress
passed similar statutes to waive the sovereign immunity of the RFC. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act § 4; Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Mehinan
Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 84–86 (1941). See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at
346–47.
352 Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 316. On the other hand, some
commentators also proposed some administrative review of an agency decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Shahabian, supra note 11,
at 379–83.
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5. Disclosure
Finally, the government should disclose all actions and opinions of government directors on any corporate affairs of banks to
the public. The purpose of such disclosure is twofold. On the one
hand, it ensures exposure of the political influence from politicians
on these government directors to the sunshine. On the other hand,
it also ensures that government directors are faithfully implementing the government’s regulatory purpose and policy and
communicates such purpose and policy to the public.
In addition, when majority board members do not adopt
the opinion of government directors, the bank should disclose it
to the public. In such cases, disclosure can serve as an alarming
signal for public investors and creditors. They can accordingly
assess whether the decision of the business directors is excessively
risky, or whether it is simply that the opinion of the government
directors is less persuasive.353
CONCLUSION
This is a post–Financial Crisis era, where people still have
fresh memories regarding the fragility of financial systems as well
as the practice of government ownership. While the mainstream
opinion in the United States disfavored government ownership of
banks during the Financial Crisis, I provide some balanced analysis
to make the case for it to prevent bias against this practice from
evolving into blind antagonism. I believe that the U.S. banking sector should take a more positive view of government ownership of
banks. The downsides should not be exaggerated, considering that
the United States has antidotal institutions to handle them. The
benefits should neither be obscured because of widespread antagonism against this practice. With complementary institutions and
proper legal design, government ownership and directorship can be
another useful tool for the regulator to improve risk management of
banks and preserve their stability. While government ownership of
banks may not function well in other jurisdictions, there should
be a U.S. exception, under which the United States can make
government ownership of banks a blessing instead of a curse!
353 From a different perspective, Fisher proposed to improve the disclosure
rules in respect of the government’s exercise of influence in changing the board
members. See Fisher, supra note 122, at 585–98.

